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I. Introduction
Important developments occurred in the international trade law field during 2005. It was
a particularly active year for multilateral and bilateral negotiations. At the World Trade
Organization (WTO), a record number of countries engaged in accession negotiations,
though only two-Saudi Arabia and Tonga-actually acceded during the year. The WTO's
Doha Development Agenda (Doha Round) negotiations continued throughout the year,
culminating in the Hong Kong Ministerial in December. Given the difficult issues being
discussed, not much progress was made, but many viewed the negotiations and the Min-
isterial itself as a success compared with previous years. At this point, the fact that Members
are still seeking to resolve their differences is viewed as better than the alternative. Mean-
while, because of the stalled WTO talks, many countries have entered bilateral and pluri-
lateral free trade area negotiations aiming to gain trade liberalization that is slow to ma-
terialize through the WTO. For the United States, though several such talks with its trading
partners were held, only two agreements actually became law-the Central America-
Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) and the Bahrain Free Trade
Agreement (Bahrain FTA).
It was a significant year for WTO dispute settlement, where important jurisprudence
was developed on agriculture subsidization and on other aspects of subsidy law. Meanwhile,
appeals and implementation rulings are pending on the controversial issues of zeroing of
dumping margins and the reach of the fair comparison requirement under antidumping
rules. Implementation battles also continue over the U.S. trade remedy determinations on
softwood lumber from Canada, the now infamous Byrd Amendment, and the Foreign Sales
Corporation progeny.
It was a relatively slow year for U.S. trade remedy cases, though important changes may
be on the horizon for non-market economy (NME) cases and multi-respondent adminis-
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trative reviews. U.S. federal court review of agency decisions saw a good deal of activity,
but the most interesting cases remain unresolved on remand.
Finally, there were many trade-related bills introduced in Congress this year, but very
few reached full decision, with most remaining stuck in committee. The primary success
in Congress this year was the passage of CAFTA-DR and the Bahrain FTA. Various out-
standing bills may see more activity in 2006 as mid-term elections approach and as members
of Congress seek to score points with their constituents, primarily those involving China.
The Bush Administration will also likely seek passage of more free trade agreement (FTA)





As of November 2005, there were thirty ongoing WTO accessions in progress as follows
(in order of their application): Algeria, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Belarus,
Ukraine, Sudan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Seychelles, Tonga, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Lao
People's Democratic Republic, Samoa, Andorra, Lebanese Republic, Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Bhutan, Cape Verde, Yemen, Bahamas, Tajikistan, Ethiopia, Libya, Iraq, Afghani-
stan, Republic of Serbia, Republic of Montenegro, Iran, and Sao Tom6 and Principe.l While
many of these applicants made progress in the accession process,' only two countries, Saudi
Arabia and Tonga, were granted access to the WTO in 2005, becoming the 149th and
150th members of the WTO, respectively.
Two other countries, Russia and Vietnam, had also hoped to conclude accession nego-
tiations in time for the Hong Kong Ministerial in December 2005. Though each fell short
of completing the accession process, both made significant progress in the negotiations.
4
1. World Trade Organization, Accessions, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/acc-e/acc-e.htm(lastvis-
ited Feb. 27, 2006). Only two of these countries-Iran and SaoTom6 and Principe-commenced theaccession
process in 2005. World Trade Organization, Accession Working Parties Established for Iran, Sao Tom6 and
Principe (May 26, 2005), http://www.wto.org/englisbnews-e/news05-e/acc-iran-sao-mayO5-e.htin.
2. Eleven applicant countries held formal accession working party meetings in 2005, including Algeria,
Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Serbia and Montenegro, Yemen, Bhutan, Saudia Arabia, Russia, Vietnam, and
Tonga. World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: The Organization: Members and Observers,
http://www.wto.org/engishdithewto-e/whatis-e/tif-e/org6-e.hm(last visited Feb. 27, 2006).
3. The VTO General Council approved Saudi Arabia's accession on November 11, 2005. Accession ne-
gotiations had been in session since July 1993. Press Release, World Trade Organization, WTO General
Council Successfully Adopts Saudi Arabia's Terms of Accession (Nov. 11, 2005), available at http://www.wto.
org/engish/news-e/presO5-e/pr420-e.htm. Tonga first applied for accession to the WTO in June 1995, and
its accession was approved December 15, 2005. Press, Release, World Trade Organization, VeTO Minister
Successfully Approve Tonga's Membership at Hong Kong Conference (Dec. 15, 2005), available at http://
www.wto.org/english/news- e/pres05-e/pr431 e.htn.
4. Although Russia's efforts to obtain accession by December 2005 did not materialize, it sought to conclude
country-specific negotiations by year-end. Daniel Pruzin, Russian Negotiator Hopes to Finish WFOAccession Deals
by End of2005, VTO REPORTER, Nov. 15, 2005. The key outstanding issues that needed to be addressed in
the negotiations relate generally to a lack of transparency in Russia's regulations as well as to an overall high
level of corruption in the government. Russia Told to Speed Up Pace of Reform to Enter WTO This Year, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, July 1, 2005. Vietnam also lowered its expectations for 2005 accession and focused its effects on
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2. Doha Development Agenda
Although Doha Round negotiations had been in progress for more than four years, the
talks moved at a slow pace during the first part of 2005 and began in earnest in July-first
at a mini-ministerial in Dalian, China, and then in a series of intensive meetings in Geneva
that same month. These negotiations, however, did not produce the anticipated first ap-
proximations, and as negotiators returned from an August recess, WTO Members and the
business community expressed renewed urgency for an ambitious Doha Round agenda that
would result in defined modalities by the December Hong Kong Ministerial.
By early October 2005, leaders were calling for urgent attention, noting that the nego-
tiations were in crisis mode and that rapid progress was needed if the original goals were
to be met.5 At that time, WTO members remained far apart on several key issues. With
regard to agriculture, the negotiators had not agreed on formulas for the future reduction
and phase-out of domestic and export subsidies, two of the key goals that had been part of
the original framework. The same types of obstacles occurred in the non-agriculture market
access (NAMA) talks, where negotiators could not agree on formulas for tariff reduction.
And negotiations over services were particularly acrimonious, as there was strong disagree-
ment over issues such as immigration (movement of natural persons), government pro-
curement, and general market access. 6 Soon it became clear that none of the talks could
move forward until there was a breakthrough in at least one area. In particular, movement
on agriculture was needed, as the stability of the Doha Round as a whole centered on those
negotiations.
In mid-October, key WTO members tabled their first concrete offers on agriculture.
The United States first put forth proposals on both domestic support and market access,
and the European Union (EU) and G-20 nations followed with counterproposals. The U.S.
offer showed, for the first time, a willingness to accept reductions in its own domestic
subsidies and, as a result, there was new momentum in the talks. At that point, although
the negotiators remained far apart on the level and types of reductions, WTO members
passing required legislation and concluding a number of bilateral agreements. World Trade Organization,
Working Party Examines First Revision of Membership Report (Sept. 20, 2005), http://www.wto.org/english/
news-e/news05_-e/vietnam- 15sep05-e.ha. As of September 23, 2005, Vietnam had "concluded bilateral mar-
ket access negotiations with Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Chinese Taipei, Colombia,
Cuba, European Union, El Salvador, Iceland, India, Japan, Republic of Korea, Norway, Paraguay, Singapore,
Switzerland, Turkey and Uruguay." Id. But The United States and Vietnam had yet to conclude a bilateral
agreement due to differences on various issues, such as trading rights for foreign business entities and the status
of state trading enterprises (STEs). While Vietnam pledged to offer full trading rights to foreign businesses by
January 1, 2007, the United States had previously requested that Vietnam eliminate any such restrictions prior
to or immediately upon accession. Vietnam Edges Toward Accession; STES, Trading Rights Still in Play, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, Sept. 23, 2005.
5. See, e.g., Daniel Pruzin, Chair ofNAMA Talks Warns of Crisis, Cites Wide Gaps on Tariff-Cutting Formula,
WTO REPORTER, Oct. 27, 2005; The International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, BRIDGES
WEELoY TRAtDE Ntws DIGEST, Oct. 19, 2005, available at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/05-10-19/BRIDGES
Weekly9-35.pdf; Jason Subler, World Leaders Urge Successful Talks At Hong Kong Ministerial in December, WTO
REPORTER, Oct. 18, 2005; Press Release, The European Round Table of Industrialists, World Business Leaders
Express Deep Concern Over Status of WTO Negotiations (Sept. 6, 2005), available at http://www.ert.be/doc/
0121.pdf.
6. Indeed, by July 2005, many countries had not even submitted initial offers on the services negotiations,
which was the prerequisite for the negotiations. Developing Countries Voice Opposition to 'Benchmarking' in WTO
Services Talks, WTO REPORTER, July 6, 2005.
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saw the possibility of ultimate agreement on the key questions of domestic and export
subsidies.7 Still, despite a spike in enthusiasm over agriculture, Members continued to di-
verge on positions related to NAMA and services.'
Due to the lack of progress, the EU and the United States were both criticized, for a
"lack of ambition" on the part of the EU, and for an aggressive, unyielding stance on the
part of the United States.9 Soon developing countries and least-developed countries (LDCs)
expressed further dissatisfaction after the EU linked its offer on agriculture to significant
reductions in industrial tariffs from other WTO Members, as well as to market access
commitments in a vast number of services sectors."' As a stalemate re-emerged on agricul-
ture, it became clear that negotiations on the other three areas could not move forward
until the contentious issues over agriculture were resolved."I Indeed, the only area that had
seemingly progressed on track-trade facilitation-also broke down in early November
when the chair of the negotiations suggested concrete deadlines for a draft text. 2
As the talks began to falter, it was necessary to recalibrate the goals for the Hong Kong
Ministerial in an attempt to avoid a failure of the Doha Round altogether. 3 Further, with
the U.S. fast-track negotiating authority set to expire in July 2007, it became clear that
negotiators needed to focus on manageable goals or risk ultimate lack of engagement by
7. See THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (ICTSD) AND THE INTER-
NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (IISD), DorH ROUND BRIEFING SERIES: HONG KONG
UPDATE 1 (Nov. 2005), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/trade-doha-hk-update.pdf [hereinafter
Doha Round Briefing Series]; see also Christopher S. Rugaber, U.S. Praised for Doha Farm Proposal, ITO
REPORTER, Nov. 22, 2005.
8. Doha Round Briefing Series, supra note 7.
9. Id.
10. See id.; Christopher S. Rugaber, APEC Leaders Call on EU to Show Flexibility and Initiative in WTO Talks,
WTO REPORTER, Nov. 21, 2005. Becoming more incensed at what they referred to as disproportionate demands
by the EU, developing countries accused rich countries of trying to seek "a round for free" and to "sow division
among developing countries." The International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Rich Coun-
tries Seeking "Round for Free," Say Nine Developing Countries, BRIDGES WEEKLY TRADE NEWS DIGEST, Nov.
30, 2005, at 3, 4, available at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/05-11-30/BRIDGESWeekly9-41.pdf; see also Daniel
Pruzin, Developing Countries Accuse Rich WTO Members of Seeking 'Round for Free', WTO REPORTER, Nov. 29,
2005.
11. See Doha Round Briefing Series, supra note 7; Daniel Pruzin, WrTC Chair Seeks Consensus on Services,
Despite No Agreements in Ag Talks, NAMA, VeTO REPORTER, Nov. 21, 2005.
12. See Esther Lam, WTO Talks on Trade Facilitation Falter On Draft's Mention of DeadlinesforAction, INTO
REPORTER, Nov. 15, 2005. The lack of progress on the agriculture negotiations and the consequent breakdown
of the Doha talks generally has also hindered discussions in other regional and bilateral free trade initiatives.
For example, with agriculture as a key element in the FTAA negotiations, some have argued that the FTAA
negotiations cannot realistically move forward until the political climate in the Doha round improves. See, e.g.,
Rossella Brevetti, Future of FTAA Turns on Unblocking Doha Agriculture Talks, OAS Head Says, WTO REPORTER,
Nov. 17, 2005. Where there are divisions in Doha, those divisions arise in regional negotiations as well. Id.
13. See The International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Members 'Recalibrating' Expec-
tations for Hong Kong and Beyond, BRIDGES WEEKLY TRADE NEWS DIGEST, Nov. 16, 2005, available at http://
www.ictsd.org/weekly/05-1 1-16/BRIDGESWeekly9-39.pdf; Gary G. Yerkey, United States 'Ratchets Down'Er-
pectations for WTO Ministerial Meeting in December, WTO REPORTER, Nov. 16, 2005; Daniel Pruzin, Talks on
WTO Ministerial in Disarray As EU, G-20 Members Clash Over Ag, NAMA, INTO REPORTER, Nov. 16, 2005;
U.S., EU Officals Acknowledge They Will Miss Goals at Hong Kong, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 11, 2005; The
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Members Scale Back Expectations for Hong
Kong, BRIDGES WEEKLY TRADE NEws DIGEST, Nov. 9, 2005, available at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/05-11-09/
BRIDGESWeekly9-38.pdf, Daniel Pruzin, WTO Talks in Confusion as Lamy Urges Recalibration of Hong Kong
Goals, INTO REPORTER, Nov. 9, 2005; see also ICTSD Doha Round Briefing Series, supra note 7, at 1.
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the United States.' 4 Consequently, in the weeks leading up to the Hong Kong Ministerial,
the goal was simply to outline the work to be done in order to conclude the Doha Round
successfully in 2006.
On November 26, 2005, Pascal Lamy, the WATO Director-General, issued a draft dec-
laration outlining the minimum goals to be achieved at the Hong Kong Ministerial." Most
notably, the draft declaration requested that WTO Members establish new dates for com-
pleting full modalities in the areas of agriculture and NAMA.' 6 While some WTO Members
expressed disappointment over the lack of operational content in the draft, others referred
to the document as realistic.'Y In general, most WTO members agreed that the declaration
was essentially a status report and that, if the Doha Round is to have any success, the Hong
Kong Ministerial must result in a defined calendar and framework for completion of the
necessary work in the year 2006.1
As expected, negotiators in Hong Kong remained deadlocked on agriculture and NAMA
issues and did not agree on any specific commitments.'9 Instead, negotiators set a new
deadline of April 30, 2006 as the target date for agreement on the structure and percentages
of tariff and subsidy cuts in both agricultural and industrial sectors.2 0 In addition, negotiators
established a deadline of July 31, 2006 for submission of draft schedules of commitments.'
Many believed that the April deadline was not realistic, and that a real package would not
emerge until the July deadline.22
Despite the failure to reach a formal agreement in Hong Kong, negotiators did make
progress on a few key issues. In agriculture, the negotiators agreed that: (1) all forms of
export subsidies would be eliminated by 2013; (2) domestic subsidies would be reduced
according to a "3-tier" (or "band") structure, with the EU in the first tier (committing to
the largest reductions), the United States and Japan in the second tier (at the next level of
14. Pascal Lamy, Director-General, Speech at the Hong Kong Foreign Correspondents Club (Oct. 16,
2005), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/sppl-e/spplO8-e.htm.
Like it or not, the timetable for these negotiations is set on Capitol Hill in Washington, D.C. Uniquely,
the United States of America has a legal structure in which the legislature holds constitutional authority
to conduct trade and must transfer that authority to the President and his team of negotiators. That
authority expires at the end of June 2007.
Id.
15. World Trade Organization, Doha Work Programme: Preparations for the Sixth Session of the Minis-
terial Conference, Draft Ministerial Text, JOB(05)/298 (Nov. 26, 2005) [hereinafter WTO Draft Ministerial
Text); see also Daniel Pruzin, WTO Chief Lssues Minimalist Text of Achievable Goals for Hong Kong, WTO RE-
PORTER, Nov. 29, 2005.
16. WTO Draft Ministerial Text, supra note 15.
17. See id.; Daniel Pruzin, EU Trade Chief Mandelson Lodges Harsh Criticirm of WTO Chair Texts, WTO
REPORTER, Nov. 28, 2005; Lamy Effort for Detailed Hong Kong Text Falters Over Opposition, INSIDE U.S. TRADE,
Nov. 18, 2005.
18. See Daniel Pruzin, WTO's Agriculture, NAMA Chairs Issue Draft Inputs for Hong Kong Declaration, TO
REPORTER, Nov. 23, 2005; Daniel Pruzin, Trade Ministers to Identify Areas of Agreement for Hong Kong, WTO
REPORTER, Nov. 23, 2005 [hereinafter Pruzin, Trade Ministers]; Lamy Effort for Detailed, supra note 17; Chris-
topher S. Rugabar, APEC Trade Ministers Seek to Boost Doha, WTO REPORTER, Nov. 16, 2005.
19. See The International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Can London Deliver What Hong
Kong Couldn't?, BRIDGES (Jan.-Feb. 2006), available at http://www.ictsd.org/nonthly/bridges/BRIDGES l0-l.pdf
[hereinafter Can London Deliver].
20. Id.
21. Id. at 2.
22. Id.
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reductions), and all other WTO members in the third tier (requiring the lowest reductions);
and (3) market access commitments would fall within four "bands," though specific reduc-
tions for each tier were not defined. 3 In the NAMA negotiations, ministers agreed in Hong
Kong that tariffs would be reduced according to the "Swiss Formula," which cuts high
tariffs more steeply than low tariffs.14 There are, however, variations on the Swiss Formula,
and the specific "coefficients" to be applied in the formula remained a divisive issue.2"
Following the Hong Kong meeting, administration officials reiterated in the press that
the July 2007 expiration of fast track authority was a firm deadline, as the President did not
seem prepared to seek an extension of that authority.2 6 The next formal meeting of the
trade ministers was tentatively scheduled for March 2006 and was expected to be an inten-
sive negotiating session.27
B. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
STEEL NEGOTIATIONS
The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) steel nego-
tiations on curbing global steel subsidies ceased in 2005. After two years of talks, steel-
producing countries were unable to bridge differences on permissible subsidies. While the
United States, the EU, Brazil, and India agreed on prohibiting subsidies that created or
maintained unviable steel capacity, these countries could not agree on the acceptable
amount and type of subsidies, the use of trade remedies, the countries that should be per-
mitted special and differential treatment, and the type of treatment that such countries
should receive.2" As a replacement to the negotiations, the OECD is proposing a steel
committee to collect steel market data and review national steel policies.29 In addition, the
OECD will create a global forum to hold annual or biannual meetings for major steel-
producing countries not on the steel committee. 0
C. BILATERAL AND REGIONAL NEGOTIATIONS
As of January 1, 2005, the United States had implemented seven bilateral and regional
FTAs: the Israel FTA, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Jordan
FTA, the Chile FTA, the Singapore FTA, the Morocco FTA, and the Australia FTA. In
addition, the United States had completed negotiations on the Bahrain FTA and the
CAFTA-DR, which includes Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicara-
gua, and was seeking U.S. implementing legislation on each.
The United States also was in the process of negotiating five other FTAs: the Free Trade
of the Americas Agreement (FTAA); the South African Customs Union (SACU) with Bo-
tswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland; the Andean FTA with Colombia,
23. Id. at 7.
24. Id. at 9.
25. Can London Deliver, supra note 19, at 9.
26. Jerry Hagstrom, U.S. Offdals Firm on '06 Deadline for Doba Negotiations, CONGRESS DMALY, Jan. 10, 2006.
27. Pruzin, Trade Ministers, supra note 18.
28. See OECD Attempts to Extend Life of Steel Subsidy Agreement Talks, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Mar. 25, 2005;
Future of OECD Steel Subsidy Talks Hinge on U.S. Commitment, INSIE U.S. TRADE, July 22, 2005.
29. See OECD Call Off Deadlocked Multilateral Steel Subsidy Negotiations, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Oct. 7, 2005.
30. See id.
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Peru, and Ecuador; the Thailand FTA; and the Panama FTA. The United States also
initiated FTA negotiations in 2005 with Oman and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). FTA
negotiations with these two countries are part of the Bush Administration's plan to create
a Middle East FTA, with several countries in the region, by 2013. 31
By the end of 2005, the United States completed FTA negotiations with only two coun-
tries-Oman and Peru. The Oman FTA, announced in October 2005, provides for duty-
free industrial and consumer goods upon implementation with a ten-year phase-out for
tariffs on agricultural products." Negotiations on the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agree-
ment concluded in December 2005 as a precursor to the broader effort to sign the Andean
FTA with Peru, Columbia, and Ecuador."
In 2005, most U.S. negotiations failed to progress quickly until Congress passed the
CAFTA-DR implementing legislation, a high priority for the Bush Administration. The
legislation passed on July 29, 2005, clearing the path for other countries' FTA negotiations
to move forward.
4
The United States centered its negotiations toward the latter half of the year with the
hope of making major progress before the December 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial. The
United States continued negotiations on the FTAA, the Andean FTA, the Panama FTA,
the SACU, the Thailand FTA, and the UAE FTA, but none were concluded by the end
of the year. The FTAA, in particular, remained stalled on such issues as intellectual property
rights and domestic farm subsidies." U.S. negotiations with Andean countries Columbia
and Ecuador also remained stuck on differences over agriculture and intellectual property.
3 6
In addition, U.S. FTA negotiations with Panama have been stalled since February 2005
over a number of sensitive issues, including agriculture products, government procurement
rules for contracts related to projects on the Panama Canal Authority, Panama's constitu-
tional ban on foreign firms engaging in retail trade, and textile rules of origin. 7
After a year-long standoff, SACU negotiations resumed in September 2005. Difficulties
remained, however, particularly in intellectual property, government procurement, agri-
culture, and textiles. Parties hope to conclude an FTA by December 2006.1s Meanwhile,
the United States and Thailand made significant progress in their FTA negotiations on
services, investment, and technical barriers to trade. The two countries, however, still need
31. See George W Bush, Message to the Congress of the United States (Oct. 17, 2005), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/10/20051017-9.html.
32. See Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, United States and Oman Conclude Free
Trade Agreement (Oct. 3, 2005), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document-Library/Press-Releases/2005/
October/United_ States _Oman- Conclude- Free-Trade_Agreement.htrnl.
33. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, United States and Peru Conclude Free Trade
Agreement (Dec. 7, 2005), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Docunent-Library/Press-Releases/2005/
December/assetupload-file744_8518.pdfht=.
34. See infra Part VI.A for further details regarding the implementation legislation for CAFTA-DR and the
Bahrain FTA.
35. See FTAA Likely Stalled through 2006 After Contentious Talks in Argentina, INSImE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 11,
2005.
36. SeeAndean FTA talks 'On Hold', WASH. TRADE DAILY, Nov. 24, 2005.
37. See U.S., Panama Again Fail to End FTA Talks, No Date Set for Next Round, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Feb. 11,
2005; Panama Seeks What It Sees as Final Round of FTA Negotiations with U.S., INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Aug. 26,
2005.
38. SeeA Halting US-SACUFTA Negotiation, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Oct. 4, 2005.
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to resolve key differences on financial services and tariffs on foreign pick-up trucks2 9 Lastly,
the United States expected that a few more rounds of talks with UAE negotiators were
necessary to resolve outstanding issues by the end of 2005.
40
On the global front, bilateral and regional negotiations moved forward for a number of
countries in 2005. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations was especially active in FTA
negotiations with China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand.41 Likewise, Aus-
tralia undertook bilateral trade negotiations with the UAE, Malaysia, and China.42 Other
countries in FTA negotiations in 2005 included the EU with Mercosur and Canada with
South Korea.
43
Ill. WTO Dispute Settlement Activity
The dispute settlement proceedings in 2005 continued to focus largely on claims under
the Agreement on Implementation of article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (AD Agreement), the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM
Agreement), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT). In general,
the number of complaints brought in 2005 dropped from prior years, down to eleven
complaints in the year, compared with nineteen the prior year and a ten-year average of
thirty-three cases per year.44 But despite the decline in new complaints, the Dispute Settle-
ment Body (DSB) handled a large number of complex cases in 2005 with the issuance of
20 panel decisions, nine Appellate Body reports, and six arbitration awards. 4 1 Most notably,
39. See U.S., Thailand Finish Another FTA Round, WASH. TRADE DALY, Oct. 4, 2005, at 3.
40. See U.S., Oman Complete FTA Negotiations, WASH. TRADE DAILY, Oct. 5, 2005, at 1.
41. See Association of Southeast Asian Nations, IOth ASEAN Summit: Asean Takes Bold Steps to Accelerate
Integration of Priority Sectors, FTA Negotiations, ASEANONE, Jan. 17, 2005, available at http://www.aseansec.
org/aseanone/article211 .pdf.
42. See Online Guide to Australia's Free Trade Agreements, Free Trade Agreements Under Discussion,
http://www.fta.gov.au/Default.aspx?ArticlelD = 190 (last visited Feb. 27, 2006).
43. See Associated Press, EU, Mercosur Agree to Relaunch Talks, BVOM.coM, Sept. 2, 2005, http://
www.bvom.com/news/engish/news/index.asp?.sequence = 34285&.this = 58; Press Release, Department of For-
eign Affairs and International Trade, Canada to Consult Canadians on Free Trade Talks with South Korea (Jan. 31,
2005), available at http://wOl.international.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.asp?publication-id = 382107&Language
=E.
44. World Trade Organization, Chronological List of Dispute Cases, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-
e/dispu-e/dispu-status-e.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2006). The number of complaints in 2005 include two
challenges that were newly filed in November 2005. On November 15, 2005, Ecuador requested consultations
challenging the U.S. practice of zeroing as was applied in its antidumping investigation against shrimp from
Ecuador. See Request for Consultations by Ecuador, United Sates-Anti-Dumping Measure on Shrimp from
Ecuador, WT/DS335/I (Nov. 21, 2005). The EC, India, Brazil, and Thailand have all joined the request for
consultations. Request to Join Consultations by the European Communities, UnitedStates-Anti-dumpingMea-
sure on Shrimp from Ecuador, WT/DS335/2 (Nov. 28, 2005); Request to Join Consultations by Brazil, United
States-Anti-dumping Measure on Shrimp from Ecuador, WT/DS335/4 (Nov. 30, 2005); Request to Join Con-
sultations by India, United States-Anti-dumping Measure on Shrimp from Ecuador, WT/DS335/3 (Nov. 30,
2005); Request tojoin Consultations by Thailand, United Sates-Anti-dumpingMeasureonShrimp from Ecuador,
V/T/DS 335/5 (Dec. 2, 2005). On November 21, 2005, the EU filed a request for the establishment of a panel
to consider import restrictions on retreaded tires imposed by Brazil. See Request for the Establishment of a
Panel by the European Communities, Brazil-Measures Affecting Imports ofRetreaded Tyres, WT/DS3 32/4 (Nov.
18, 2005).
45. See WTO Panel and Appellate Body Reports & WTO Arbitrations, available at http://www.world
tradelaw.net.
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given the complexity of the disputes before the DSB, disagreements over implementation
of panel and appellate body decisions became common in 2005.
A. PANEL AND APPELLATE BODY DECISIONS
1. European Communities-Export Subsidies on Sugar
In late 2004, a WTO Panel found that the European Communities (EC) had violated
the WTO Agreement on Agriculture because it exceeded its scheduled commitments on
sugar exports every year since 1995 and provided export subsidies in excess of the negotiated
concessions.- The Panel also determined that, as a result of the violations of the Agriculture
Agreement, the EC had nullified or impaired the benefits accruing to its trading partners,
also in violation of article 3.8 of the Agriculture Agreement.47 The Panel declined to make
parallel findings under the SCM Agreement based on judicial economy.4 s
In January 2005, EC members Australia, Brazil, and Thailand filed notices of appeal.-9
The Appellate Body issued its report on April 28, 2005, upholding all of the Panel's find-
ings. 0 The Appellate Body, however, disagreed with the Panel's decision not to rule on the
SCM Agreement claims."' The Appellate Body stated that, in declining to rule on the claims,
the Panel failed to discharge its duties under article 11 of the Dispute Settlement Under-
standing (DSU) because the remedies available under the SCM Agreement were different
from the Agriculture Agreement."2 But the Appellate Body determined that it could not
complete the analysis because the Panel had not made any factual findings with regard to
the SCM Agreement claims.5 3
The EC agreed to implement the recommendations of the Panel. On October 28, 2005,
an arbitration panel decided that the reasonable period of time for implementation should
be just over one year, until May 22, 2006.14
2. United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton
On March 3, 2005, the Appellate Body issued its report in United States-Subsidies on
Upland Cotton." The dispute, brought by Brazil challenging U.S. subsidy programs on
upland cotton, is significant because it was the first subsidy dispute in which violations were
46. Panel Report, European Communities-Export Subsidies on Sugar, 9 7.235-.238, WT/DS265/R,WT/
DS266/R, WT/DS283/R (Oct. 15, 2004). The Panel issued a separate report for each complaint brought by
Australia, Brazil, and Thailand. Aside from the noted complainants and case numbers, the three Panel reports
are identical.
47. Id. 7.373-.374.
48. See id. The Panel based its conclusion on its finding that the EC had focused its arguments on the
Agriculture Agreement claims and had not thoroughly set forth the SCM Agreement claims. Id.
49. Notification of an Appeal by the European Communities, European Communities-Export Subsidies on
Sugar, VT/DS265/25, WT/DS266/25, WT/DS283/6 (Jan. 13, 2005).
50. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Export Subsidies on Sugar, $$ 284-286, 290, 300, WTI
DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R (Apr. 28, 2005).
51. Id. 99 329-341.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Award of the Arbitrator, European Communiies-Export Subsidies on Sugar, 106, ARB-2005-3/20 (Oct.
28, 2005).
55. Panel Report, United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, $ 7.388, 7.413-.414, 7.608, WT/DS267/R
(Sept. 8, 2004).
SUMMER 2006
226 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
found under both the Agriculture Agreement and the SCM Agreement. Thus, the case
paved the way for future disputes under the SCM Agreement over agriculture subsidies.1
6
Prior to 2004, WTO member countries were obligated to refrain from bringing chal-
lenges to agricultural subsidies under the SCM Agreement in accordance with the Peace
Clause contained in article 13 of the Agriculture Agreement. Although the Peace Clause
still applied in the Upland Cotton dispute, the Panel found that the United States had violated
the provisions of the Peace Clause, and therefore it was not immune from claims under the
SCM Agreement. 7 Specifically, the Panel found that certain U.S. domestic support pro-
grams were not "green box" and thus were not exempted from the domestic support re-
duction commitments under the Agriculture Agreement-in other words, by improperly
treating the subsidies as exempt, the United States exceeded its reduction commitments.58
Because the programs were not protected by the Peace Clause, the Panel also determined
that the domestic support programs constituted actionable subsidies under the SCM Agree-
ment because they caused serious prejudice to Brazilian producers.5 9 The Panel also found
that the United States provided prohibited export subsidies in violation of both the Agri-
culture and SCM Agreements.-
On appeal, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel decision on nearly all findings.61 The
United States was required to bring its measures into conformity with the Agriculture and
SCM Agreements byJuly 1, 2005 (regarding prohibited export subsidies) and by September
21, 2005 (regarding domestic programs).62 But after expressing criticism of the Appellate
Body decision, the United States allowed both deadlines to pass with no action.63 Brazil
sought authorization to retaliate in the amount of US$1 billion annually or a suspension
of market access concessions. 64 On November 21, 2005, the United States and Brazil an-
nounced that they had reached an agreement in principle to suspend the ongoing arbitration
proceedings and any retaliation in return for a U.S. commitment to bring its cotton subsidy
programs into compliance.6 s At the time of this writing, the details of the agreement had
not yet been announced.
3. U.S. and EC Countervailing Duty Investigations on Dynamic Random Access Memory
Semiconductors from Korea
In 2005, disputes over Dynamic Random Access Memory semiconductrors (DRAMs)
from Korea resulted in two WTO Panel decisions and an Appellate Body report. In United
States-Countervailing Duty Investigation on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors
from Korea, Korea challenged the U.S. determination that a major Korean exporter of
56. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15,
1994, annex IA, Agreement on Agricudrue, at art. 13 (Peace Clause) (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/
english/docs-e/egale/14-ag.pdf.
57. Panel Report, WT/DS267/R, upra note 55.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. 1 7.748-.749, 7.752-.761.
61. Appellate Body Report, United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, 262-329, WT/DS267/AH/R
(Mar. 3, 2005).
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semiconductors, Hynix Semiconductor, Inc., was subsidized by the Korean government as
part of various restructuring initiatives. In its countervailing duty investigation, the U.S.
Department of Commerce (DOC) found that, although the loans and restructuring initia-
tives were provided by private banks, they constituted government financial contributions
because, according to the DOC, the private financial institutions were entrusted or directed
by the government to provide subsidies to Hynix, as defined in article 1.1 (a)(1)(iv) of the
SCM Agreement.-
Korea challenged the determination, arguing that the United States improperly pre-
sumed entrustment or direction.67 Korea also challenged the U.S. findings of benefit, spec-
ificity, and various aspects of the injury determination.6
In February 2005, the Panel circulated its report holding that the U.S. finding of en-
trustment or direction was inconsistent with article 1.1 (a)(l)(iv) of the SCM Agreement. 69
Although the DOC had established that the Korean government had the means to entrust
or direct the private banks, the Panel ruled that the DOC had not established, as a factual
matter, that entrustment or direction actually occurred.0 As a result of the flawed reasoning
on financial contribution, the Panel determined that the DOC's determinations regarding
benefit and specificity were also inconsistent with the SCM Agreement.7 The Panel also
found that the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) had failed to abide by the
requirement under article 15.5 of the SCM Agreement to ensure that the effects of other
causes were not attributed to imports.
On an appeal brought by the United States, limited to the subsidy (i.e., non-injury) issues,
the Appellate Body reversed the Panel's findings regarding entrustment or direction, ruling
that the Panel improperly considered whether "the individual pieces of evidence" were
.sufficient to establish entrustment or direction" and "erred in failing to examine the ...
evidence in its totality."72 The Appellate Body explained, however, that "[e]ven though we
reverse the Panel's findings, we offer no view as to the consistency of the [DOC's] under-
lying determinations of benefit and specificity.""7 The Appellate Body report was adopted
July 20, 2005.74 The United States has agreed to implement the remainder of the Panel
decision (i.e., the flaws in the ITC's injury determination) by March 8, 2006. 75
Just prior to adoption of the U.S. - DRAMs Appellate Body decision, in June 2005, a
separate Panel issued a determination in European Communities-DRAMs from Korea con-
cerning the same Hynix restructuring.76 The Panel's decision was mixed, finding that the
66. Panel Report, United States-Countervailing Duty Investigation on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semi-
conductors (DRAMs)from Korea, 919 2.1-2.5, WT/DS296/R (Feb. 21, 2005).
67. Id. IT9 7.43-44.
68. Id. 9117.9, 7.220-.405.
69. Id. 17.10.
70. Id. 11 7.175-.176.
71. Id. 7.190, 7.206.
72. Appellate Body Report, United States-Countervailing Duty Investigation on Dynamic Random AccessMem-
ory Semiconductors (DRAMs)from Korea, 91 157-58, VWT/DS296/AB/R (June 27, 2005).
73. Id. 1208.
74. Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting, WT/DSB/M/194, at 16 (Aug. 26, 2005).
75. Agreement Under Article 21.3(b) of the DSU, United States-Countervailing Duty Investigation on Dy-
namic Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMs) from Korea, WT/DS296/1 1 (Nov. 8,2005). See also Esther
Lam, US. to Implement WTO Ruling to Settle Korean DRAM Complaint, VTO REPORTER, Nov. 17, 2005.
76. Panel Report, European Communities-Countervailing Measures on Dynamic Random Access Memory Chips
from Korea, WT/DS299/R (June 17, 2005).
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EC improperly determined financial contribution and benefit with respect to certain re-
structuring programs while upholding the determination with regard to other programs."
Specifically, the Panel determined that the evidence relied upon by the EC was insufficient
to find entrustment or direction by private banks to provide subsidies under a May 2001
restructuring program and that, in finding a benefit under the Syndicated Loan Program,
the EC failed to properly consider the fact that several private banks extended loans under
similar terms; thus, such loans may have been made on a commercial basis. 7s The Panel
also found that the injury determination was flawed with respect to the finding of causation
but upheld various other aspects of the injury finding. 9
The EC-DRAMs decision was not appealed, and the report was adopted August 3,
2005.80 On October 12, 2005, the EC notified the DSB that the agreed upon reasonable
period of time for implementation in accordance with article 21.3 of the DSU would be
eight months, expiring April 3, 2006.1
4. United States-Laws, Regulations and Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins
On October 31, 2005, a WTO panel issued the latest report in the ongoing challenges
against the U.S. practice of zeroing in antidumping investigations. In United States-Laws,
Regulations and Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins, the Panel addressed the ques-
tion, posed by the EC complaint, of whether the U.S. practice of zeroing negative margins
in its antidumping calculations was a violation of articles 2.4 and 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement.
This dispute was unique from prior cases on zeroing because the EC not only challenged
the practice in investigations but also in administrative reviews, sunset reviews, new shipper
reviews, and changed circumstances reviews. 2 The case also sought to utilize Appellate
Body jurisprudence finding that a Member may challenge "a well-established and well-
defined norm" (in this case, the U.S. practice of zeroing negative margins, which is written
into the standard antidumping margin program and has been invariably applied in all cases)
even if that norm is not codified in law. 3
With regard to zeroing in investigations, the Panel reiterated the prior statements by the
Appellate Body in European Communities-Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-
Type Bed Linen from India and United States-Final Dumping Determination on Soft-
wood Lumber from Canada (U.S.-Lumber AD Final), explaining that zeroing of margins
in antidumping investigations violates article 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement that requires a
comparison of the weighted average of the normal value with the weighted average of all
77. Id. j 7.103-.109, 7.181-.186.
78. Id. 99 7.181-.186.
79. Id. 99 7.349, 7.359-.362.
80. See Action by the Dispute Settlement Body, European Communities-Countervailing Measures on Dynamic
Random Access Memory Chips from Korea, WT/DS299/6 (Aug. 5, 2005).
81. Agreement Under Article 21.3(b) of the DSU, European Communities-Countervailing Measures on Dy-
namic Random Access Memory Chips from Korea, WT/DS299/7 (Oct. 17, 2005).
82. In addition to the direct challenges of the U.S. statutes, regulations, programs, and procedures, the EC
challenged fifteen final determinations in investigations and sixteen final results in administrative reviews con-
ducted by the United States. Panel Report, United States-Laws, Regulations and Methodology for Calcu-
lating Dumping Margins ("Zeroing"), 2.1-.12, WTIDS294IR (Oct. 31, 2005).
83. Id. 91 7.92-. 104 (applying the Appellate Body's findings concerning such practice-based challenges in
United States-Sunset Review ofAnti-Dumping Duties on Corrosion -Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Produasfrom Japan,
1 88, WT/DS244/AB/R (Dec. 15, 2003)).
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comparable export transactions. 4 The Panel therefore found the DOC's application of
zeroing in the various investigations at issue to violate article 2.4.2. The Panel also con-
cluded that the DOC's consistently applied norm or methodology of zeroing was also in
violation of article 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement 5 -a finding that has important implications.
Because zeroing is not explicitly required in U.S. statutes or regulations, without a finding
against the basic methodology, WTO Members would need to bring repeated cases against
each instance of zeroing. Instead, the Panel's finding that the methodology is in itself a
violation requires a general change to the methodology as applied in all future cases.
A majority of the Panel came to a different conclusion with regard to zeroing in admin-
istrative reviews.8 6 Two panelists found that the requirement to use all comparable export
transactions 7 applies only to the investigation phase as is articulated in article 2.4.2 of the
AD Agreement.s" Thus, the Panel found that the U.S. practice of zeroing in administrative
reviews, changed circumstances reviews, sunset proceedings, and new shipper reviews did
not offend article 2.4.2. One of the three panelists dissented on this issue, finding that the
U.S. practice of zeroing in reviews was in violation of the fair comparison requirement in
article 2.4 of the AD Agreement. 9 Should the decision be appealed, the proper interpre-
tation of article 2.4 may be determined by the Appellate Body.-
Meanwhile, the issue of zeroing has been further complicated by U.S. implementation
efforts following the Appellate Body's rulings in U.S.-Lumber AD Final. Although the
Appellate Body had determined that zeroing applied in the lumber investigation was in-
consistent with article 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement, section 129 implementation determi-
nation on April 15, 2005, the DOC changed its fair value comparison methodology but
continued to apply zeroing.91 Specifically, the DOC used a transaction-to-transaction com-
parison rather than its traditional weighted average-to-weighted average comparison, and
continued to zero negative margins that resulted from the fair value comparisons claiming
that the Panel and Appellate Body decisions precluded zeroing when using weighted-
average to weighted-average comparisons but that they were silent on zeroing when apply-
84. Id. 7.27. In contrast, the U.S. practice of zeroing entails comparing the weighted-average normal value
with the weighted-average dumping margins for only those export transactions in which the export price is
lower than the normal value. Where the export price exceeds the normal value (i.e., there is a negative dumping
margin), the United States zeroes that margin by ignoring the amount of export price in excess of normal value.
85. Id. 91 7.105-.106
86. Id. 7.221-.222.
87. Id. 9 7.284.
88. Panel Report, WT/DS294/R, supra note 74, 99 7.221-.222.
89. Id. 99 9.6-62.
90. There is an ongoing dispute brought by Japan involving the U.S. practice of zeroing but alleging ad-
ditional violations outside article 2.4 of the AD Agreement. See Request for the Establishment of a Panel by
Japan, United States-Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset Reviews, WT/DS322/8 (Feb. 7, 2005). Thus, in
contrast to the decision in U.S.-Zeroing, the Panel in the Japan zeroing dispute could find a violation as to zeroing
in antidumping reviews. The Panel in the Japan challenge is expected to issue its report in March 2006. Communication
from the Chairman of the Panel, United States-Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset Reviews, WT/DS322/10
(Nov. 17, 2005).
91. Establishment of a Panel by Japan, WT/DS322/8, supra note 90; Communication from the Chairman,
WT/DS322/10, supra note 90; see also Anti-dumping Measures Concerning Softwood Lumber Products From
Canada, 70 Fed. Reg. 22,636 (Dep't of Commerce May 2, 2005) (notice of determination under section 129
of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act).
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ing a transaction-to-transaction comparison.92 Canada is seeking recourse under article
21.5, challenging the United States' failure to comply.93 The article 21.5 Panel is scheduled
to issue its ruling in February 2006.
94
5. Other Disputes
A number of other Panel and Appellate Body decisions were issued in 2005, relating
primarily to claims under the DSU and the GATT. In Mexico-Tax Measures on Soft Drinks
and Other Beverages, the Panel determined that certain taxes disadvantaged sugar producers
in violation of GATT articles mH:2 and II:491 In Dominican Republic-Measures Affecting
the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel's con-
clusions that a tax stamp requirement was in violation of GATT article 111:4 (requiring that
any measure not afford less favorable treatment to imports over domestic goods). 96
Three additional decisions relate to claims under the AD Agreement. In United States-
Oil Country Tubular Goods from Mexico, the Appellate Body upheld, in large part, the DOC
and ITC determinations in the U.S. antidumping investigation. 97 In Korea--Antidumping
Duties on Imports of Certain Paper from Indonesia, a Panel issued a mixed ruling, finding that
Korea acted consistently with the AD Agreement with regard to certain calculations and
procedures but was inconsistent with the Agreement with respect to other findings and
procedures (including its failure to inform parties in a manner that would allow them to
adequately prepare for the investigation). 98 In Mexico-Definitive Anti-dumping Measures on
Beef and Rice, the Appellate Body upheld a prior panel decision holding that Mexico's anti-
dumping determination involving rice from the United States was inconsistent with the AD
Agreement. The Appellate Body confirmed that Mexico's determination violated the AD
Agreement in several respects, including the failure to rely on adequate evidence for pur-
poses of the injury determination, the failure to immediately terminate the investigation
with regard to producers who demonstrated de minimis margins, and the use of facts avail-
able in a manner that was inconsistent with the AD Agreement."
Finally, in a dispute brought against the United States by Antigua and Barbuda, United
States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, the Ap-
pellate Body upheld a prior Panel decision finding that the United States had violated
market access commitments under the General Agreement on Trade in Services by pro-
92. Establishment of a Panel byJapan, WT/DS322/8, supra note 90; Communication from the Chairman,
WT/DS322/10, supra note 90; 70 Fed. Reg. 22,636.
93. See Request for the Establishment of a Panel, United States-Final Dumping Determination on Softwood
Lumber from Canada, WT/DS264/16 (May 20, 2005).
94. See Communication from the Chairman of the Panel, United States-Final Dumping Determination on
Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS264/24 (Sept. 20, 2005).
95. Panel Report, Mexico-Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WTIDS308IR (Oct. 7, 2005).
96. Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic-Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cig-
arettes, WT/DS302/AB/R (Apr. 25, 2005).
97. Appellate Body Report, United States-Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods (OCTG)
from Mexico, WT/DS282/AB/R (Nov. 2, 2005).
98. Panel Report, Korea-Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Certain Paper from Indonesia, WT/DS312/R
(Oct. 28, 2005).
99. See Appellate Body Report, Mexico-Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Beef and Rice, WT/DS295/
AB/R (Nov. 29, 2005); see also Daniel Pruzin, WTO Appellate Body Upholds US. In Complaint Against Mexican
Rice Duties, VTO REPORTER (Nov. 30, 2005).
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hibiting the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services."l° In doing so, the Ap-
pellate Body rejected U.S. arguments that its restrictions at issue fell within the public
morals and public order exception of article XIV(a) of that agreement.
B. DISPUTEs REGARDING IMPLEMENTATION
Disputes over the implementation of Panel and Appellate Body decisions continued to
be a primary part of the DSB agenda, with parties challenging the time period or method
of implementation (or lack thereof) in a number of key disputes.
1. United States-Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000
In late 2004, the complainants in the United States-Continued Dumping and Subsidy
Offset Act of 2000 (the Byrd Amendment) dispute-Brazil, Canada, Chile, the EC, India,
Japan, Korea, and Mexico-were authorized to suspend concessions against the United
States for its failure to implement the decision of the Appellate Body.01 While several bills
have been presented to Congress that would repeal the Byrd Amendment, to date Congress
has failed to repeal the legislation. 12 As a result, in early 2005, Canada, the EU, Mexico,
and Japan began retaliating against the United States by imposing taxes on imports of a
variety of U.S. goods, including live swine, cigarettes, paper, agricultural products, textiles,
machinery, oysters, and fish products. 103 And, after years of contention, on February 1,2006,
Congress passed legislation to repeal the Byrd Amendment1 °4 However, the repeal does
not take effect until October 1, 2007.105 As a result, the EU Trade Commissioner responded
with "regret" that the United States has chosen to include a transition period rather than
ending the payments immediately.'0° The EU indicated that it would work in close coor-
dination with the other complainants to determine the implications of the compromise
repeal."'7 In the meantime, the retaliation is expected to continue until the legislation is
repealed.
100. Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply ofGamblingandBetting
Services, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005).
101. Decision by the Arbitrator, United States-Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offiet Act of 2000, WT/
DS234/ARB/CAN (Aug. 31, 2004). In accordance with the Byrd Amendment, the United States redistributes
antidumping and countervailing duties to U.S. producers who meet certain criteria. The distributions under
the Byrd Amendment amount to hundreds of millions of dollars each year, and the current countervailingduties
being held in the U.S. treasury for ultimate distribution in the lumber case alone total more than $5 billion.
WTO Panels and the Appellate Body have ruled that these disbursements are in violation of the WTO Agree-
ments. See Panel Report, WTI/DS294/R, supra note 82; Appellate Body Report, United States-Final Dumping
Determination on Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS264/AB/R (Aug. 11, 2004).
102. See infra Part VI.D accompanying text.
103. See International Trade Canada, Canada's Retaliation Notification to the WTO, (Apr. 29, 2005), available
at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/ma-nac/disp/byrd-lettre-en.asp; European Commission, U.S. Byrd Amend-
ment: Commission Proposes Sanctions on U.S. Products (Mar. 31, 2005), available at http://europa.eu.intl
comm/trade/issues/respecules/dispute/pr 10305_en.htm.
104. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Congress Takes Important Action: Byrd Repeal
Brings US Into Compliance with WTO Ruling (Feb. 1, 2006), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document.
Library/PressReleases/2006/February/CongressTakesImportantAction.htmil.
105. Id.
106. Press Release, European Commission, EU Welcomes Repeal of Byrd Amendment, Regrets Transition
Period (Feb. 2, 2006), available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.doreference=IP/06/1 17
&format = HTML&aged = 0&language = EN&guiLanguage = en.
107. Id.
SUMMER 2006
232 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
2. United States-Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations"
In October 2004, the United States enacted the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 that
repealed both the Extraterritorial Income Exclusion and its predecessor, the Foreign Sales
Corporation provision, two laws that had been deemed de facto export subsidies to U.S.
exporters. 10 As a result, on January 1, 2005, the EC lifted tariffs but then sought consul-
tations on whether the new law complied with the prior decisions and threatened to reim-
pose the tariffs if a panel agreed that the new law was insufficient. On September 30, 2005,
the Panel in the second proceeding, United States-Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corpo-
rations," determined that new U.S. law continued to violate the SCM and Agriculture
Agreements, given that the new law maintained the same inconsistent subsidy programs
through a grandfathering clause.109 The Panel reauthorized the EC to impose retaliatory
tariffs, and the EC was expected to impose such measures as early as January 2006.110
3. Japan-Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples
In 2003, a WTO panel and the Appellate Body determined that restrictions imposed by
Japan to prevent disease (fire blight) in domestic apples were inconsistent with the Agree-
ment on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement)."' In
response, Japan made certain modifications to its restrictions, including the lifting of certain
import prohibitions if the imports meet specified criteria." 2 The United States then sought
recourse to the DSB, complaining that the new measures continued to violate the SPS
Agreement and requesting authorization to impose retaliatory measures in the amount of
US$143.4 million annually."' On June 23, 2005, the Panel issued its report in Japan-
Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples, agreeing with the United States that Japan's
measures continued to violate the Agreement because they were "not supported by sufficient
scientific evidence,"" 4 and they were "more trade-restrictive than required to achieve Ja-
pan's appropriate level of phytosanitary protection."' I' On August 30, 2005, Japan and the
United States notified the WTO of a mutually agreed solution in which Japan had amended
its legislation, as of August 25, 2005, to bring it into compliance with the SPS Agreement." 6
4. European Communities-The ACP-EC Partnership Agreement
On January 31, 2005, the EC notified the WTO of a proposed new bound tariff for
most-favored nation (MFN) countries that would take effect January 1, 2006, while main-
108. See Appellate Body Report, United States- Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations, "WT/DS 108/
AB/R (Feb. 24, 2000).
109. See Panel Report, United States- Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations, "WT/DS 108/RW2 (Sept.
30, 2005).
110. See id.; Council Regulation 171/2005, 2005 Oj. (L 28) 32.
111. Appellate Body Report, Japan-Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples, WT/DS245/AB/R (Nov.
26, 2003); Panel Report, Japan-Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples, WT/DS245/R (July 15, 2003).
112. Id.
113. See Request for the Establishment of a Panel, Japan-Measures Affecting the Importation ofApples, VVT/
DS245/11 (July 20, 2004); Recourse to Article 22.2 of the DSU by the United States,Japan-MeasuresAffecting
the Importation of Apples, WT/DS245/12 (July 20, 2004).
114. Panel Report, Japan-Measares Affecting the Importation of Apples, 918.120 WT/DS245/RW (June 23,
2005); see also Recourse to Article 22.2 of the DSU by the United States, WT/DS245/12, supra note 113.
115. Panel Report, WTIDS245/RW, supra note 114, 9.1(c).
116. Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Japan-Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples, WT/
DS245/21 (Sept. 2, 2005).
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tamining an existing preference for African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries."' Sev-
eral countries in Latin America contested the new tariff rate, complaining that the new
bound rates would disadvantage MFN countries by giving increased market access to the
ACP countries (and consequently decreased market access for MFN countries)." 8 Upon
referring the complaint to arbitration, the arbitrator agreed, noting that the new bound
tariff system "would not result in at least maintaining total market access for MFN banana
suppliers" as is required under the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement." 9
In response to the arbitrator's award, the EC further modified its tariff proposal by
lowering the new bound rate for MFN countries. 20 At the same time, however, the EC
raised the available quota for ACP countries. 2' The interested parties in the arbitration
dispute could not agree that the revised tariff system was acceptable, and on September 26,
2005, the EC requested further arbitration over the matter.'22 In its second decision, the
arbitrator determined that the EC failed to rectify the matter because MFN banana sup-
pliers would continue to receive diminished market access under the new proposal. 2 3
5. U.S. Softwood Lumber Article 21.5 Challenges
The U.S. softwood lumber cases led to three separate WVTO disputes over implemen-
tation in 2005. In United States-Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to
Softwood Lumber from Canada, Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU, Canada chal-
lenged U.S. implementation of the Panel and Appellate Body rulings, asserting that the
United States failed to conduct a proper pass-through analysis because, although it per-
formed a limited analysis with regard to some transactions, it failed to determine if a pass-
through of benefit actually occurred with regard to a majority of transactions between
unrelated parties.14 The Panel agreed with Canada, and on December 5, 2005, the Ap-
pellate Body upheld the Panel's decision.,2"
Importantly, Canada not only challenged the U.S. failure to comply with regard to its
section 129 redetermination in the original investigation but charged that the U.S. pass-
117. As part of the Doha Ministerial conference in November 2001, WTO members negotiated a waiver
(commonly referred to as the Doha Waiver) that allows the EU to give preferential market access to banana
exports from ACP countries, with the caveat that third parties, such as countries in Latin and Central America,
would have the right to request consultations or arbitration should the EU modify its tariff quota system. See
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, W7 Arbitrator Rules Against New EU Tariff
Rates for Bananas, BRIDGES WEEKLY TRADE NEws DIGEST (Aug. 3, 2005), available at http://www.ictsd.org/
weekly/05-08-03/BRIDGESWeekly9-28.pdf. The requests for arbitration in this case were made under this
Doha Waiver. See Award of the Arbitrator, European Communities-The ACP-EC Partnership Agreement-Re-
course to the Arbitration Pursuant to the Decision of 14 November 2001, WT/L/616 (Aug. 1, 2005); Award of the
Arbitrator, European Communities-The ACP-EC Partnership Agreement-Second Recourse to the Arbitration Pur-
suant to the Decision of 14 November 2001, WT/L/625 (Oct. 27, 2005).
118. See Award of the Arbitrator, WTfL/616, supra note 117; Award of the Arbitrator, WTIL/625, supra
note 117.
119. Award of the Arbitrator, WT/L/616, supra note 117, 94.
120. See Notification by the European Communities, Eurpoean Communities-The ACP-EC Partnership
Agreement(Sept. 13, 2005); Award of the Arbitrator, WT/L/625, supra note 117.
121. Id.
122. Award of the Arbitrator, WT/L/625, supra note 117.
123. Id. 127.
124. See Appellate Body Report, United States-Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to Cer-
tain Softwood Lumberfrom Canada, WT/DS257/AB/RW (Dec. 5, 2005).
125. Id.
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through methodology as applied in the first administrative review also resulted in a failure
to comply with the DSB ruling.2 6 The Panel agreed, determining that both the section
129 determination and the administrative review results amounted to a failure to properly
implement the rulings of the DSB. In response to the failed implementation, Canada re-
quested authorization from the DSB to retaliate in the amount of C$200 million annually.
In a separate article 21.5 dispute involving the U.S. lumber injury determination, United
States-Investigation of the International Trade Commission in Softwood Lumber from Canada,
an arbitration panel affirmed the U.S. section 129 implementation determination, finding
that the United States' renewed finding of threat of injury was not inconsistent with the
AD Agreement.'27 As a result, the WTO determination pertaining to the U.S. finding of
injury did not result in revocation of the antidumping and countervailing duty orders.
Canada has not yet indicated whether it intends to appeal the U.S.-Softwood Lumber Injury
Panel decision to the Appellate Body.
Finally, as noted above, Canada is challenging the U.S. section 129 determination in
US.-Lumber AD Final, in which the DOC modified its fair value comparison method-
ology but continued to zero negative dumping margins. 2" The Panel is scheduled to issue
its decision in February 2006.129
IV U.S. Trade Remedy Cases
A. COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FEDERAL CIRCUIT CASES
1. udicial Review of Department of Commerce Determinations
a. SNR Roulements v. United States
In SNR Roulements v. United States,30 the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit re-
viewed the DOC's inclusion of imputed credit and inventory carrying costs in total U.S.
expenses used to calculate constructed export price profit.' The Court of International
Trade (CIT) had held that 19 U.S.C. § 1677a unambiguously required imputed credit and
carrying costs to be included in total expenses when they are included in total U.S. expenses,
so as to make the comparison between U.S. and total expenses consistent-and fair."'
Applying the Chevron doctrine, the Federal Circuit reversed the CIT, finding 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677a to be ambiguous, and deferred to the DOC's statutory interpretation of that pro-
vision. " ' In so doing, the Federal Circuit held that the DOC may include imputed expenses
in its calculation of U.S. expenses while including only actual expenses in calculating total
expenses, "provided that [the DOC] affords a respondent... the opportunity to make a
showing that the amount of imputed expenses is not accurately reflected or embedded in
its actual expenses." 34 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit remanded the case to provide re-
126. Id.
127. See Panel Report, United States-Investigation of the International Trade Commission in Softwood Lumber
from Canada, WT/DS277/RW (Nov. 15, 2005).
128. See 70 Fed. Reg. 22,636.
129. See Communication from the Chairman of the Panel, WT/DS264/24, supra note 94.
130. SNR Roulements v. United States, 402 E3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
131. Id. at 1361.
132. Id. at 1361-62.
133. Id. at 1361.
134. Id.
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spondents an opportunity to demonstrate whether its imputed costs were reflected in its
actual expenses.' 35
b. SKF USA Inc. v. United States
In SKF USA Inc. v. United States,136 the CIT examined the DOC's use of partial adverse
facts available (AFA) in calculating respondent's dumping margin.'37 During the adminis-
trative review, the DOC applied partial AFA for respondent's refusal to provide certain
documents at verification.' The respondent, however, asserted that it attempted to provide
such documentation to DOC verifiers. 139 Given the factual nature of the dispute, the CIT
conducted a hearing to examine the recollection and the veracity of the parties' assertions.14
The CIT found the DOC's recollection of the facts erroneous and thereby found appli-
cation of partial AFA to be unsupported by substantial evidence.' 14
c. Tokyo Kikai Seisakusho, Ltd. and TKS (USA), Inc., v. United States
In Tokyo Kikai Seisakusho, Ltd. and TKS (USA), Inc. v. United States, 42 plaintiffs challenged
as unlawful the DOC's self-initiation of an antidumping changed circumstance review cov-
ering imports of large newspaper printing presses ("LNPP") from Japan. Based on three
consecutive zero dumping margins DOC revoked the antidumping duty order in 2002 with
respect to all entries of LNPP exported by plaintiffs. Later in that same year DOC revoked
the entire antidumnping duty order on all entries of LNPP from Japan.
43
In May 2005, DOC self-initiated the changed circumstance review on LNPP from Japan
based on information obtained in a civil trial before the U.S. District Court for the North-
ern District of Iowa under the Antidumping Act of 1916. At trial information was presented
showing that the plaintiffs "provided false information" in one of the administrative reviews
before DOC regarding the sale of an LNPP to the Dallas Morning News. The evidence
concerned a secret arrangement between the plaintiffs and the Dallas Morning News. The
arrangement provided for a "fraudulent increase" in the price of the sale in exchange for
secret rebates to the Dallas Morning News with the intent to conceal the fact that the sale
was made at dumped prices.'" In its preliminary determination DOC concluded that it
would rescind the revocation of the antidumping duty order covering plaintiffs entries, and
reconsider revocation of the overall antidumping duty order under the sunset review
provision.
Plaintiffs appealed to the CIT seeking declaratory judgment and an order permanently
enjoining DOC from conducted any such review. The CIT found that subject matter ju-
risdiction did not exist for reviewing preliminary agency determinations, as the Court only
has subject mater jurisdiction over final agency determinations under 19 U.S.C. § 1516a.
135. Id. at 1362.
136. SKF USA Inc. v. United States, No. 03-00490, slip op. 05-104 (Ct. Int'l Trade Aug. 24, 2005).
137. Id. at 18.
138. Id. at 3.
139. Id. at 7.
140. Id. at 4.
141. See id. at 8, 10-11, 17.
142. Court No. 05-000348, Slip Op. 05-144 (Ct. Int'l Trade November 7, 2005).
143. See id. at 4.
144. See id. at 4-6.
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Thus, the Court held that plaintiffs' challenge was not fit for judicial review and dismissed
the case. 4
d. Non-Market Economy Cases and Surrogate Valuation Methodology
The increasing number of NME cases have led to a growing number of court appeals
addressing the adequacy of the DOC's surrogate valuation methodology. For example, in
Wuban Bee Healthy Co., Ltd. v. United States,'46 the CIT held the DOC's rejection of re-
spondent's proposed raw material values as reasonable because sufficient evidence existed
to show that the surrogate values used by the DOC was the best information available in
accordance with 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1).' 47 For the same reason, the CIT also upheld the
DOC's use of the same source data it had previously rejected to calculate the raw material
inflation factor 4s The CIT rejected, however, the DOC's use of coal import values over
domestically available non-coking steam coal values because the DOC did not adequately
explain why imported coal prices provided the best surrogate value.' 49
e. Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. United States
In Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. United States,'"° the CIT examined the DOC's counter-
vailing duty analysis of Hynix's financial restructuring between December 2000 and Oc-
tober 2001,'1l-the same analysis that generated the WTO challenge discussed above. The
DOC determined that countervailable subsidies were provided to Hynix because the Ko-
rean government caused or coerced financial institutions (including private parties) to par-
ticipate in Hynix's restructuring by making preferential loans and debt-equity swaps.'52 The
CIT affirmed the DOC's interpretation that a financial contribution from a private entity
to another private entity pursuant to government entrustment or direction is prohibited by
19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B)(iii). 1' The CIT also held that the DOC was not required to examine
the entrustment of each entity involved in each transaction comprising the single pro-
gram.5 4 Such an obligation, the CIT stated, would open a loophole in the statute and limit
the DOC's case-by-case discretion. 55
The CIT, however, remanded the final determination back to the DOC to consider
whether the transactions comprising the alleged subsidy program were formulated by an
independent commercial actor, as opposed to the government, and were motivated by com-
mercial considerations.'16 According to the CIT, the DOC did not adequately explain the
"influential role of.. . [the independent commercial actor] and the aberrational presence
of commercial contingencies in Hynix's restructuring.""'
145. See id. at 19.
146. Wuhan Bee Healthy Co. v. United States, 374 F. Supp. 2d 1299 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2005).
147. See id. at 1303-04.
148. Id. at 1305.
149. Id. at 1310-11.
150. Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. United States, No. 03-00651, slip op. 05-106 (Ct. Int'l Trade Aug. 26,
2005).
151. Id. at 3.
152. Id. at 6-7.
153. Id. at 15-22.
154. See id. at 22-30.
155. Id. at 20.
156. Hynix Semiconductor Inc., slip op. 05-106, at 14.
157. Id.
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2. Judicial Review of International Trade Commission Determinations
a. Nucor Corp. v. United States
In Nucor Corp. v. United States,155 the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT's approval of the
ITC's negative injury findings in investigations involving certain cold-rolled steel products
from various countries."s9 In those investigations, which overlapped the section 201 safe-
guard investigation on flat-rolled steel products and the President's subsequent imposition
of safeguard measures, the ITC found that the safeguard measures fundamentally altered
the market for cold-rolled steel-6 and were the principal reason for the sharp decline in
imports and rapid increase in the market prices near the end of the period of investigation.61
In affirming the lower court's decision, the Federal Circuit found that the statute allowed
the ITC to focus its analysis on the most recent data in the period. The Federal Circuit
reasoned that: (I) the purpose of the antidumping and countervailing duty laws are remedial,
and recent import data is the most appropriate in determining whether remedial measures
are necessary; (2) the most recent import data has the greatest relevance in evaluating the
current state of the domestic industry; and (3) the ITC has broad discretion to examine a
period that most reasonably allows it to determine whether a domestic industry is injured
by subject imports.162
b. Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States
Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States involves a long-simmering appeal of the ITC's
affirmative injury determination on tin- and chromium-coated steel sheet fromJapan. 16 In
the initial appeal, the CIT found that the ITC's affirmative determination was not sup-
ported by substantial record evidence and remanded to the ITC.'- On remand, the ITC
again made an affirmative material injury determination.16 The CIT, however, found that
the ITC was still unable to support its determination with substantial evidence and ordered
the ITC to enter a negative injury determination.-6 The ITC appealed to the Federal
Circuit, which vacated the CIT's decision and ruled that the ITC should have been given
another opportunity to correct various flaws in its determination.16
In its remand determination following the Federal Circuit ruling, the ITC made another
affirmative material injury determination. 68 Upon review, the CIT again found the ITC's
158. Nucor Corp. v. United States, 414 F3d 1331 (Fed. Cit. 2005).
159. Id. at 1334-35.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1335.
162. Id. at 1336-37.





Thus, to the extent the Court of International Trade engaged in refinding the facts (e.g., by determining
witness credibility), or interposing its own determinations on causation and material injury itself, the
Court of International Trade, we hold, exceeded its authority. On the present record, the Court of
International Trade should have remanded once again for further proceedings rather than instructing
entry by the Commission of a negative injury determination.
Nippon Steel Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 345 F.3d 1379, 1381-82 (Fed. Cit. 2003).
168. See Nippon Steel Corp., slip op. 05-38, at 2.
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remand determination unsupported by substantial evidence and ordered the ITC to enter
a negative material injury finding.169 The CIT also ordered the ITC to examine whether a
threat of material injury existed.1 °
In its third remand, the ITC entered negative material injury and threat determina-
tions."' The CIT upheld both negative determinations, though it rejected certain subsidiary
findings regarding the ITC's negative threat finding.' The CIT's latest decision is now
pending appeal to the Federal Circuit. Meanwhile, the antidumping order on these products
remains in place.
3. China Textiles Case
In U.S. Association of Importers of Textiles and Apparel v. United States, "I the Federal Circuit
reviewed whether the CIT abused its discretion in enjoining the Committee for the Im-
plementation of Textile Agreements (CITA) "from accepting, considering, or taking any
further action on threat-based petitions" when requesting consultations with China under
a special safeguards provision regarding the importation of textiles under China's accession
agreement to the WTO.7 4 The petition requesting consultations was filed just prior to the
expiration of the quotas allowed by the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, the
lifting of which petitioners argued would lead-in the future-to a flood of imports from
China and, in turn, to market disruption.
The Federal Circuit held that the CIT abused its discretion in enjoining threat-based
petitions, finding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success that the
CITA's interpretation of the statute and procedures were contrary to law.' As an initial
matter, the Federal Circuit found that a mere novelty in the legal question raised is insuf-
ficient to meet the likelihood of success standard applied by the lower court. 76 The Federal
Circuit proceeded to find that the CIT lacked jurisdiction because the CITA's action at
issue was not a final agency action as set forth in Federal Trade Commission v. Standard Oil
Co.'77 As to the substantive claims, the Federal Circuit concluded, inter alia, that the lan-
guage of paragraph 242 of the accession agreement does not require actual current market
disruption prior to imposing a safeguard.' As a result, the Federal Circuit concluded that
the plaintiff was not likely to succeed on the merits and therefore reversed the CIT's pre-
liminary injunction. 9
B. NAFTA EXTRAORDINARY CHALLENGE CoMMITTEE DECISIONS
In Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, the NAFTA Extraordinary Challenge
Committee (ECC) expressly recognized a reviewing court's ability to reverse the ITC's
169. See id. at 2-3.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 3. The CIT's decision ordering the ITC to enter a negative material injury finding was appealed
to the Federal Circuit. See Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, No. 01-00103, slip op. 05-72 (Ct. Int'l Trade
2005).
172. See Nippon Steel Corp., slip op. 05-38, at 14.
173. U.S. Ass'n of Importers of Textiles and Apparel v. United States, 413 E3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
174. Id. at 1345-46.
175. Id. at 1346.
176. Id. at 1347.
177. Id. at 1349-50.
178. Id. at 1350-53.
179. US. Ass'n of Importers of Textiles and Apparel, 413 F3d at 1352-53.
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determination. In this case, the ECC reviewed the ITC's continued affirmative threat de-
terminations after two remands for reconsideration.1" The reviewing panel in that case
found that the ITC's second remand determination "provided neither new evidence from
the record nor further analysis to support the [ITC]'s findings on the issues remanded to
it."" ' As a result, the panel remanded the matter to the ITC for redetermination in a manner
consistent with its analysis (i.e., that there was no substantial evidence supporting the ITC's
affirmative threat findings).182
In reviewing the panel's determination, the ECC recognized that NAFTA panels have
the ability to reverse ITC determinations when not supported by substantial evidence." 3
The ECC supported the CIT's analysis in Nippon that the reviewing court's powers cannot
be viewed "so narrowly as to give rise to endlessly futile remands" (i.e., converting judicial
review of agency action into a ping-pong game). 84
C. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
CoMMIssIoN DETERMINATIONS
1. Frozen Warmwater Shrimp and Prawns From India and Thailand
Following the DOC's affirmative final antidumping determination in 2004,8s the ITC
issued an affirmative material injury determination for frozen warmwater shrimp and
prawns from Brazil, Ecuador, India, the People's Republic of China, Thailand, and the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam."s6 According to the ITC, the large increase in the volume
of subject imports caused domestic prices to decline, in turn causing material injury to the
domestic industryYs7 An antidumping order was therefore imposed on February 1, 2005.188
180. Extraordinary Challenge Committee, Opinion and Order: In the Matter of Certain Softwood Lumber
Products from Canada, ECC-2004-1904-01USA(Aug. 10, 2005).
181. Id. at T 10.
182. See id. at 14.
183. In NAFTA proceedings, the panel's power is similar to that of the CIT, which is normally limited to
remanding an agency's decision for reconsideration in a manner not inconsistent with its decision, and only
allows the CIT to reverse the agency's determination under rare circumstances. Endlessly futile remands is one
of those rare circumstances.
184. See ECC-2004-1904-OIUSA, supra note 180, at T 45-46.
185. Certain Frozen and Canned Warmwater Shrimp from India, 69 Fed. Reg. 76,916 (Dep't of Commerce
Dec. 23, 2004) (notice of final determination of sales at less than fair value and negative final determination of
critical circumstances); Certain Frozen and Canned Warmwater Shrimp from Thailand, 69 Fed. Reg. 76,918
(Dep't of Commerce Dec. 23, 2004) (notice of final determination of sales at less than fair value and negative
final determination of critical circumstances).
186. U.S. International Trade Commission, Certain Frozen or Canned Warmwater Shrimp and Prawns from
Brazil, China, Equado, India, Thailand, and Vietnam, Pub. 3748, Inv. Nos. 73 1-TA-1063-1068 (Final) (Jan.
2005).
187. Seei. at 35.
188. Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from Brazil, 70 Fed. Reg. 5,143 (Dep't of Commerce Feb. 1, 2005)
(notice of amended final determination of sales at less than fair value and antidumping duty order); Certain
Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from Ecuador, 70 Fed. Reg. 5,156 (Dep't of Commerce Feb. 1, 2005) (notice of
amended final determination of sales at less than fair value and antidumping duty order); Certain Frozen
Warmwater Shrimp from India, 70 Fed. Reg. 5,147 (Dep't of Commerce Feb. 1, 2005) (notice of amended
final determination of sales at less than fair value and antidumping duty order); Certain Frozen Warmwater
Shrimp from the People's Republic of China, 70 Fed. Reg. 5,149 (Dep't of Commerce Feb. 1, 2005) (notice
of amended final determination of sales at less than fair value and antidumping duty order); Certain Frozen
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On April 25, 2005, the ITC determined that changed circumstances, sufficient to warrant
a review of the orders, existed in light of the potential impact that the December 26, 2004,
tsunami had on the shrimp industries of India and Thailand." 9 On November 2, 2005, a
unanimous ITC found that the revocation of the order as to India and Thailand would be
likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of material injury to the domestic industry
within a reasonably foreseeable time. Thus, the order remained in place as to those coun-
tries. Nevertheless, the ITC's decision to conduct a changed circumstances review was
significant, as it was the first time in which the ITC instituted such a review based on
circumstances arising in a foreign country rather than in the United States.
2. Outboard Engines from Japan
The DOC issued an affirmative final determination for imports of outboard engines from
Japan.'90 For its part, however, the ITC issued a final negative determination of material
injury.' 9' The ITC's determination relied heavily upon a finding that the conditions of
competition, particularly the domestic industry's inability to manufacture certain types of
subject imports, mitigated any apparent adverse volume and price effects on the domestic
industry.192 Therefore, the ITC found that the domestic outboard engines industry was not
materially injured by reason of subject imports. 93
3. Live Swine from Canada
The DOC issued affirmative final antidumping determinations' 94 and a negative final
countervailing duty determination 95 for imports of live swine from Canada.l96 As part of
its negative countervailing determination, the DOC addressed novel affiliation issues, as
many of the companies investigated by the DOC were characterized by complex cross-
ownerships and/or were involved in acquisitions during the period of investigation.' 97 A
unanimous ITC subsequently issued a final negative material injury determination given
the modest volume increases of subject imports, the absence of any price depression in the
U.S. market, and the robust health of the domestic industry.9 s
Warmwater Shrimp from Thailand, 70 Fed. Reg. 5,145 (Dep't of Commerce Feb. 1, 2005) (notice of amended
final determination of sales at less than fair value and antidumping duty order); Certain Frozen Warmwater
Shrimp from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 70 Fed. Reg. 5,152 (Dep't of Commerce Feb. 1, 2005) (notice
of amended final determination of sales at less than fair value and antidumping duty order).
189. Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp and Prawns from India and Thailand, 70 Fed. Reg. 23,884 (Dep't
of Commerce May 5, 2005) (institution and scheduling of changed circumstances review).
190. Outboard Engines from Japan, 70 Fed. Reg. 326, 328 (Dep't of Commerce Jan. 4, 2005) (notice of
final determination of sales at less than fair value) (finding a weighted-average dumping margin of 18.98% for
all respondents).
191. U.S. International Trade Commission, Outboard Engines from Japan, Pub. 3752, at 1, Inv. No. 731-TA-
1069 (Final) (Feb. 2005).
192. See id. at 11-22,25-31.
193. Id. at 1.
194. Live Swine from Canada, 70 Fed. Reg. 12,181 (Dep't of Commerce Mar. 11, 2005) (notice of final
determination of sales at less than fair value).
195. Id. at 12,186 (final negative countervailing duty determination).
196. Id. at 12,185 (finding dumping margins from de minimis to 12.68%).
197. Accompanying decision and issues memorandum (unpublished).
198. U.S. International Trade Commission, Live Swine from Canada, Pub. 3766, at 16-24, Inv. No. 731-TA-
1076 (Final) (Apr. 2005).
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4. Magnesium Metal from the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation
The DOC issued affirmative final antidumping determinations on magnesium metal from
the People's Republic of China' 99 and the Russian Federation. 00 For Russia, the DOC, for
the first time, used actual values provided by responding companies (as opposed to surrogate
values) since that country's graduation to market economy status in 2002. In doing so,
however, the DOC addressed the issue of adjusting the responding companies' electricity
costs given the alleged involvement of the Russian government in the electricity sector.2°'
The issue is significant because any refusal by the DOC to accept prices and costs on the
grounds of government involvement in particular sectors of the economy would limit the
benefits of being identified as a market economy. Although the DOC found that Russia's
electricity sector did not operate based on market principles and is still in the early stages
of reform, it nevertheless relied on the actual costs provided by the responding companies
because it was unable to reliably discern the effect of government distortion. °20 Notably,
the DOC stated its willingness to adjust costs in future investigations where "evidence of
continuing significant distortions ... is accompanied by sufficient evidence or analysis with
respect to the impact of such distortions on energy prices paid by respondent firms." °3
5. Large Newspaper Printing Presses and Components Thereof, Whether Assembled or
Unassembled, From Japan
In Large Newspaper Printing Presses and Components Thereof, Whether Assembled or Unas-
sembled, From Japan,2°4 the DOC conducted a changed circumstances review of respondent
Tokyo Kikai Seisakusho, Ltd. (TKS), the antidumping order which had been revoked in
January 2002 after receiving zero dumping margins in three consecutive administrative
reviews."" The changed circumstances review was self-initiated based on an unrelated ju-
dicial proceeding in federal court that uncovered information that TKS provided to the
DOC regarding a sale that was the subject of one of the DOC's administrative reviews.2 6
Upon review of the information submitted in that administrative review, as well as docu-
ments from the federal court proceeding, the DOC found that TKS provided false infor-
mation regarding discounts and rebates extended to its customer.07 Specifically, TKS's
199. Magnesium Metal from the People's Republic of China, 70 Fed. Reg. 9,037 (Dep't of Commerce Feb.
24, 2005) (final determination of sales at less than fair value and affirmative critical circumstances) (finding
dumping margins for Chinese producers/exporters of 49.66%).
200. Magnesium Metal from the Russian Federation, 70 Fed. Reg. 9,041 (Dep't of Commerce Feb. 24,
2005) (notice of final determination of sales at less than fair value) (finding dumping margins for Russian
producers/exporters ranging from 18.65 to 21.71%).
201. See id. at 9,042-44.
202. See id. at 9,043-44.
203. Id. at 9,044. A unanimous ITC likewise issued an affirmative final determination of material injury
based on its finding that the volume and price of subject imports had a significantly adverse impact on the
domestic industry. U.S. International Trade Commission, Magnesium from China and Russia, Pub. 3763, at 18,
20-21, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-1071 and 1072 (Final) (Apr. 2005).
204. Large Newspaper Printing Presses and Components Thereof, Whether Assembled or Unassembled,
From Japan, 70 Fed. Reg. 54,019 (Dep't of Commerce Sept. 13, 2005) (preliminary results of changed circum-
stances review).
205. Id. at 54,020.
206. Id. The judicial proceeding involved a claim under the Antidumping Act of 1916. See Coss Int'l Corp.
v. Tokyo Kikai Seisakusho, Ltd., 321 F Supp. 2d 1039 (N.D. Iowa 2004).
207. 70 Fed. Reg. 54,019, 54,021.
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response in the administrative review stated that it did not extend any rebates or discounts,
although the federal court proceeding uncovered information contradicting that claim. 08
The DOC preliminarily determined that application of facts available was warranted under
19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a)(2) for withholding information requested by the DOC, resulting in
a dumping margin of 56.97 percent,2°9 and paving the way for reinstatement of the anti-
dumping order for TKS.
V. Agency Policy Initiatives
A. NEW CONTINUOUS BONDING REQUIREMENTS FOR AGRI/AQUACULTURE PRODUCTS
SUBJECT TO AD/CVD DUTIES
Effective July 9, 2004, the U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) an-
nounced new guidelines for determining continuous bond requirements for importers of
agriculture/aquaculture merchandise subject to antidumping and countervailing duty cases.210
Although issued in 2004, the new policy was not implemented in earnest until 2005, upon
imposition of the antidumping order on frozen warmwater shrimp. The new guidelines
concern the continuous bond that all importers must carry to cover uncollected customs
duties or fees that CBP might later determine are due. Under normal circumstances, the
amount of bond held by CBP is relatively modest (in most cases $50,000) and would typ-
ically cover only a fraction of the total antidumping and/or countervailing duties ultimately
due. Indeed, the continuous bond was never meant to cover such increased antidumping
and countervailing duties. CBP, however, announced an increase in the amount of the bond
for imports of agriculture and aquaculture products subject to antidumping and counter-
vailing duty orders given its experience with various orders on Chinese food products for
which several importers neglected to pay CBP when their final liability exceeded the initial
cash deposits. The amount of bond posted for such imports must now cover the entire
amount of antidumping and/or countervailing duties that are expected to be due for a given
year. At least one appeal to the CIT challenging the new rule and its application to shrimp
imports was pending at the time of this writing.
B. NON-MARKET ECONOMY COUNTRY ANTIDUMPING PROCEEDINGS
In 2005, the DOC announced several new policies for NME country antidumping pro-
ceedings. The first policy involves the DOC's change to its separate rate practice, effective
April 5, 2005.11 As part of that policy change, rather than requiring non-mandatory re-
spondents to complete a Section A questionnaire, the DOC will require such respondents
208. Id. at 54,021.
209. Id. at 54,019.
210. See Amendment to Bond Directive 99-3510-004 for Certain Merchandise Subject to Antidumping/
Countervailing Duty Cases, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (July 9, 2004), available at http://www.cbp.
gov/xp/cgov/import/addcvd/bonds/07082004.l.
211. See Separate Rates and Combination Rates in Antidumping Investigations involvingNon-MarketEcon-
omy Countries, 70 Fed. Reg. 17,233 (Dep't of Commerce Apr. 5, 2005) (announcement of change in practice);
see also U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Import Administration Policy Bulletin 05.1, Separate Rates Practice andAp-
plication of Combination Rates in Antidumping Investigations InvolvingNon-Market Economy Countries (Apr. 5, 2005),
available at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/policy/buI05 -1.pdf.
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to complete an application that streamlines the necessary information but limits the DOC's
acceptance of deficient responses. Also, as part of the change, the DOC's cash deposit rates
assigned to exporters wVill apply to producer-exporter combinations in NME countries as
opposed to just exporters. According to the DOC, the application of exporter-specific rates
to both exporters and a producer would prevent producers from sending subject merchan-
dise through exporters with the lowest rates.
The DOC also requested comments concerning changes in its practice for valuing market
economy inputs in NME cases.2 ' The DOC had normally accepted market economy pur-
chase prices in place of surrogate values even if such purchases represented a small per-
centage of overall purchases of an input. Now, the DOC has proposed to use respondents'
market economy purchase prices to value the input (provided the DOC's four traditional
requirements are met) only when the majority of each input by volume is sourced from
market economy countries. If respondents source less than a majority of the total volume
of an input from market economy countries, but still meet the DOC's four other require-
ments,"3 the DOC proposed weight-averaging the prices paid by respondents on their
purchases from market economy countries with the surrogate value for products purchased
domestically (or from unaccepted market economies). At the time of this writing, the DOC
was still considering comments on this issue.
Another proposal for consideration in 2005 concerned the DOC's policy on calculating
wages in NME proceedings.' 4 Currently, the DOC uses a regression-based wage rate anal-
ysis to calculate NME wages by taking hourly wages from certain market economy countries
and charting the data against an NME country's gross national income. The DOC has
requested comments on its methodology. At the time of this writing, the DOC's wage policy
was still under consideration.
C. DUTY DRAWBACK IN ANTIDUMPING PROCEEDINGS
On June 30, 2005, the DOC also requested comments on possible changes to its practice
on duty drawback adjustments in antidumping proceedings. 2" The DOC traditionally has
granted a duty drawback adjustment to export prices when respondents establish that the
import duty and the rebate payment are directly linked to each other, and sufficient imports
of the imported raw material occurred to account for the drawback received upon export.
As part of its request for comments, the DOC considered whether: (1) parties seeking a
duty drawback adjustment should be required to demonstrate that they actually paid import
duties on some raw material inputs that were not rebated; (2) how the amount of the
adjustment should be determined when some of the domestically-sourced and imported
212. See Market Economy Inputs Practice in Antidumping Proceedings involving Non-Market Economy
Countries, 70 Fed. Reg. 30,418 (Dep't of Commerce May 26, 2005) (request for conments); Market Economy
Inputs Practice in Antidumping Proceedings involving Non-Market Economy Countries, 70 Fed. Reg. 46,816
(Dep't of Commerce Aug. 11, 2005) (request for comments).
213. DOC's four requirements are that the purchases (1) reflect bona fide sales; (2) were made in market
economy currency; (3) constitute a meaningful quantity; and (4) could have been used in the production of the
subject merchandise. See 70 Fed. Reg. 46,816 (request for comments).
214. See Expected Non-Market Economy Wages, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,761 (Dep't ofCommerceJune 30, 2005)
(request for comments on calculation methodology).
215. See Duty Drawback Practice in Antidumping Proceedings, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,764 (Dep't of Commerce
June 30, 2005) (request for comments).
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materials were used; and (3) how to determine duty drawback amounts when it is claimed
on some, but not all, exports incorporating the material input at issue. As of the time of
this writing, the DOC was still considering comments on this issue. 16
VI. Legislative Activity
In 2005, the first session of the 109th Congress wimessed a flurry of trade legislation on
a number of substantive issues. Congress introduced several new bills for consideration on
implementing legislation for the CAFTA-DR and the Bahrain FTA; China; trade enforce-
ment; the Byrd Amendment; the imposition of countervailing duties on NME imports; new
shipper reviews; trade preferences' U.S. sanctions laws; and country-of-origin labeling.
While lawmakers introduced numerous bills, however, Congress passed only a few, includ-
ing the CAFTA-DR implementing legislation, country-of-origin labeling, and sanctions
on Burma, Iran, and Syria. Notably, Congress failed to introduce or pass any legislation on
the Export Administration Act and Russian Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR).
A. FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS
Having signed a FTA with the six Central American countries of Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic in mid-2004, the Bush
Administration spent the first half of 2005 pressing for congressional passage of CAFTA-
DR's implementing legislation. The CAFTA-DR was one of the most controversial trade
agreements negotiated by the Bush Administration. Organized labor, the sugar industry,
and certain textile industry associations strongly opposed the CAFTA-DR. While Dem-
ocratic opponents claimed that the CAFTA-DR would lead to job losses in the United
States, Republican supporters viewed the agreement as a way to promote democracy in the
region.
217
After receiving commitments by the Bush Administration to a cap on sugar imports and
a promise of additional funds for U.S. workers, the U.S. Senate approved the measure 54
to 55 on June 30, 2005.218 After several additional weeks of intense debate, the House of
Representatives finally passed the bill on July 28, 2005, by a two-vote margin of 217 to
215.219 The Bush Administration had made assurances on the CAFTA-DR's textile provisions
and commitments on China trade to wavering lawmakers in its push for final passage.225 The
U.S. Senate then approved the House-passed version of the bill on July 29, 2005. On August
216. The DOC also issued its final rule governing the Steel Import Monitoring and Analysis System (SIMA).
See Steel Import Monitoring and Analysis System, RIN: 0625-AA64, (Dec. 2005), http://ia.ita.doc.gov/steel/
license/index.honI. The SIMA final rule extends and expands the steel import licensing regime untilMarch 21,
2009. The DOC expanded the licensing requirement to include all basic steel mill products but removed certain
downstream products. The SIMA system was originally established in the President's March 5, 2002, Steel
Safeguard Proclamation.
217. See Business Groups Hail CAFTA-DR Passage in House, but Frustrated Opponents Cry Foul, 22 INT'L TRADE
REP. (BNA) 31, Aug. 42005, at 1290.
218. See UNrED STATES SENATE, U.S. SENATE ROLL CALL VoTEs 109TH CONGREss-lST SESsioN, available
at http.J/www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/rol-caH-ists/ro -call-vote-cfn.cfin?congress= 109&session = I &vote
= 00170 (reporting on S. 1307 action as of June 30, 2005).
219. See UNITED STATES HousE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FINAL VOTE RESULTS FOR ROLL CALL 443, available at
htrp://clerk.house.gov/evs/2005/ro1443.xml(reporting on H.R. 3045 action as of July 28, 2005).
220. See Business Groups Hail CAFTA-DR, supra note 217, at 1289.
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2, 2005, President Bush signed the Dominican Republic-Central America-United State Free
Trade Agreement Implementation Act into law.2 ' The CAFTA-DR was to go into effect on
January 1, 2006. However, due to a delay by the Central American countries in passing
requisite domestic laws to implement the agreement, the United States announced a delay
in CAFTA-DR implementation.222
Once Congress passed the CAFTA-DR, the Bush Administration focused on congres-
sional approval of the Bahrain FTA implementing legislation. Unlike the CAFTA-DR, the
implementing legislation for a Bahrain FTA had more support in the House and Senate.
The Bahrain government had made commitments to the United States that it would begin
efforts to dismantle its participation in the Arab League's primary economic boycott of
Israel.22 The Senate Finance Committee unanimously approved a bill on November 18,
2005, after including language that the United States would monitor Bahrain's commitment
to dismantle its boycott.24 While not as contentious as the CAFTA-DR debates, U.S.
lawmakers in the House did raise concerns on Bahrain's labor laws.22 After receiving certain
assurances from the Bahrain government related to the treatment of unions, the House
Ways and Means Committee passed final implementing legislation on November 18,
2005.226 The full House passed the implementing legislation on December 7, 2005 the
Senate following suit on December 13, 2005.227
Lastly, on March 30, 2005, President Bush formally asked Congress to extend Trade
Promotion Authority (TPA) 2s The TPA allows the Administration to negotiate trade
agreements that Congress may not amend after the introduction of implementing legisla-
tion. Under procedures in the 2002 Trade Act, the President's TPA authority was to expire
on July 1, 2005. But since Congress did not adopt a disapproval resolution before that date,
TPA was extended until July 1, 2007.
B. CH NA
Congress focused on several outstanding U.S.-China trade issues including Chinese cur-
rency and trade enforcement. On February 3, 2005, Senators Charles Schumer (D-NY)
and Lindsey Graham (R-SC) introduced a bill that would impose a 27.5 percent tariff on
China's exports to the United States six months after the bill comes into law unless the
221. Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub.
L. No. 109-53, 119 Stat. 462 (2005).
222. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. Statement of USTR Spokesman Stephen Nor-
ton regarding CAFTA-DR Implementation (Dec. 30, 2005), available at http://www.ustr.gov.
223. See Ways & Means Presses on Labor Isues in Hearing on Bahrain FTA, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Sept. 30,2005.
224. See House, Senate Committees Approve Bahrain FTA Unanimously, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 25, 2005.
225. See Ways & Means Presses on Labor Issues in Hearing on Bahrain FTA, supra note 223.
226. See Press Release, Committee on Ways and Means, Thomas Announces Committee Action on H.R.
4340, the "United States-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act" (Nov. 21, 2005), available at
http'J/waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode = view&id =4478&keywords = bahrain + free + trade.
227. See Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Statement of USTR Rob Portman on House
Passage of Bahrain Full Trade Agreement (Dec. 7, 2005), available at http://www.ustr.gov; Press Release, Office
of the U.S. Trade Representative, Statement of USTR Rob Portman on Senate Passage of Bahrain Free Trade
Agreement, (Dec. 14, 2005), available at http://www.ustr.gov.
228. See Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Administration Requests Extension ofTrade
Promotion Authority (Mar. 30, 2005), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document-Library/Press-Releases/
2005/March/AdministrationRequests_ Extension-ofTradePromotion-Authority.html.
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President certifies that China is no longer manipulating its currency.22 9 Critics allege that
China's currency, aligned to the dollar, is significantly undervalued, thereby making its
exports cheaper. In November 2005, Senators Schumer and Graham announced a delay in
the vote until March 31, 2006, at the latest, in the hopes that China may still take steps to
revalue its currency.230
On the House side, several lawmakers introduced China currency bills. Representatives
Duncan Hunter (R-CA) and Tim Ryan (D-OH) introduced legislation (H.R. 1498) on April
6, 2005 that would make China's currency actionable under U.S. countervailing duty laws
as an export subsidy and would define market disruption under the China specific section
421 safeguard to include exchange rate manipulation.' In addition, Representative Phil
English (R-PA) introduced a bill (H.R. 3004) on June 21, 2005, that that would require the
U.S. Department of Treasury to report on China's exchange rate policies and impose ad-
ditional tariffs on Chinese imports based on the rate of exchange rate manipulation.
22
Congress took no further action on either of these bills in 2005.
On the trade enforcement side, Republican lawmakers English and Bill Thomas (R-CA)
introduced a bill on July 14, 2005, entitled United States Trade Rights Enforcement Act
(H.R. 3283), aimed at addressing a myriad of U.S.-China trade issues.233 The legislation
creates a comprehensive monitoring program of China's commitments under the Joint
Commission on Commerce and Trade with respect to its trade obligations on intellectual
property and market access. It requires the Bush Administration to issue semiannual reports
to Congress on whether China is taking the requisite steps to fulfill its trade commitments
and what steps the Administration would take if China fails to meet them. In cases where
China has specifically promised action by the end of the year, the bill requires monthly
reports.
While not specifically mentioning China, the bill requires the U.S. Department of Trea-
sury to issue a report defining currency manipulation. In addition, the legislation authorizes
$6 million annually in trade enforcement funds for the U.S. Trade Representative's (USTR)
office. The bill also includes specific provisions on changes to U.S. trade remedy laws.
Separately, the House Democrats introduced the Fair Trade with China Act of 2005
(H.R. 3306) on July 14, 2005, which includes many similar provisions as Representative
English's bill. Additionally, it includes a provision to strengthen U.S. law on China safe-
guard measures and requires the Administration to file a WTO dispute settlement case
against China over its currency policy within ninety days.
On July 27, 2005, the House approved the Republican-sponsored bill, H.R. 3283, with
a vote of 255 to 168.34 As noted above, the bill helped to ensure additional votes on the
CAFTA-DR implementing legislation in the House. On the Senate side, Senator Susan
229. S. 295, 109th Cong. (2005) (to authorize appropriate action if the negotiations with the People's Re-
public of China regarding China's undervalued currency are not successful).
230. See WASH. TRADE DAILY, Nov. 17, 2005.
231. See Chinese Currency Act of 2005, H.R. 1498, 109th Cong. (2005).
232. See Currency Harmonization Initiative Through Neutralizing Action Act of 2005, H.R. 3004, 109th
Cong. (2005).
233. See United States Trade Rights Enforcement Act, H.R. 3283, 109th Cong. (2005).
234. See UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIWES, FINAL VOTE RESULTS FOR ROLL CALL 437, available at
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2005/rol437.xml (reporting on H.R. 3283 action as of July 27, 2005) [hereinafter
FINAL VoTE RESULTS FOR ROLL CALL 4371.
VOL. 40, NO. 2
BUSINESS REGULATION 247
Collins (R-ME) introduced a similar bill on July 19, 2005.35 As of the time of this writing,
Congress took no further action on either the House or Senate bill.
C. TRADE PREFERENCES
In 2005, Congress continued its efforts to grant duty preferences to Africa, Haiti, LDCs,
and Ukraine. On June 30, 2005, Representative Jim McDermott (D-WA) introduced a bill
tided Answer Africa's Call Act (H.R. 3175) that seeks to remove trade barriers impeding
economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa. The bill modifies preferential trade treatment for
imports from the region by extending a third-country fabric provision granted under the
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) until September 20, 2015. AGOA's current
third-country fabric provisions expire in September 2007. In addition, the legislation elim-
inates high over-quota tariffs the United States imposes on all agriculture imports from
sub-Saharan Africa subject to tariff rate quotas. Certain imports, however, entering above
quota still could be subject to tariffs if their price is lower than a trigger price equal to the
product's average import price. Congress took no further action on this bill.
In 2005, supporters of trade preferences for Haiti reportedly were developing a compro-
mise bill for reconsideration before the 109th Congress.13 6 Senate and House members,
however, decided to introduce their own legislation identical to a Senate bill introduced in
2004 (S. 2261) that failed to pass the House. On October 28, Senator Mike DeWme (R-
OH) introduced S. 1927 that would grant duty-free access for certain Haitian apparel prod-
ucts. 37 Representative Kendrick Meek (D-FL) introduced a companion bill on November
6, 2005.238 Congress, however, took no further action on these bills.
On February 17, 2005, Representative Jim Kolbe (R-AZ) introduced a bill (H.R. 886)
titled the Tariff Relief Assistance for Developing Economic Act of 2005 (TRADE Act) to
extend certain trade preferences to fourteen LDCs in the Asian, Middle East, and Pacific
regions. Under the bill, eligible beneficiary countries would receive duty-free treatment on
certain articles, particularly textiles and apparel, not currently covered by other trade pref-
erences programs. The TRADE Act's benefits are similar to those provided under the
AGOA. Senator Gordon Smith (R-OR) introduced a similar bill in the Senate (S. 191). At
the end of the year, both bills remained in congressional committee.
Several bills by different lawmakers sought to extend PNTR treatment to Ukraine. While
House members introduced three separate bills, Congress took no action on them in
2005.239 On the Senate side, Senators Carl Levin (D-MI), John McCain (R-AZ), and Rich-
ard Lugar (R-LN) introduced legislation on the same issue. In addition to extending PNTR
treatment to Ukraine, Senator Levin's bill (S. 46) also established market access terms
between the two countries and allowed bilateral safeguard measures in response to import
surges. The Bush Administration, however, expressed concern that these issues were better
235. See United States Trade Rights Enforcement Act, S. 1421, 109th Cong. (2005).
236. See DeWine, Thomas work on Haiti Textile Bill Despite NCTO Opposition, INsmE U.S. TRADE, May 20,
2005.
237. See Haiti Economic Recovery Opportunity Act, S. 1937, 109th Cong. (2005).
238. See Haiti Economic Recovery Opportunity Act, H.R. 4211, 109th Cong. (2005).
239. See H.R. 885, 109th Cong. (2005) (legislation introduced by Representative Hyde (R-IL) on February
17, 2005); H.R. 1053, 109th Cong. (2005) (legislation introduced by Representative Gerlach (R-PA) on March
2, 2005); H.R. 1170, 109th Cong. (2005) (legislation introduced by Representative Levin (D-MI) on March 8,
2005).
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addressed in the context of WTO negotiations.214 By the end of the year, the Senate had
passed only Senator Lugar's bill (S. 632) on November 18, 2005.241 Lastly, Congress intro-
duced no bills in 2005 granting PNTR status to Russia.
D. ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAWS
Congress introduced several important pieces of legislation in 2005 concerning U.S.
trade remedy laws. On March 10, 2005, Representative English introduced legislation (H.R.
1216) that would provide for the imposition of countervailing duties on imports from NME
countries. Currently, the DOC does not apply countervailing duty law to NMEs, in part
due to the difficulty in calculating subsidies in such markets and in part because of a fear
that such action might contravene existing law.242 Senator Collins sponsored a companion
bill (S. 593) on the same day. Both lawmakers had introduced similar bills in 2004 that
made little progress. Once again, Congress took no action on these bills.
The U.S. Trade Rights Enforcement Act (H. R. 3283) described above includes general
trade remedy provisions that, while aimed at China, extend to other countries as well. The
bill also authorizes the application of U.S. countervailing duty law to imports from NMEs
such as China and Vietnam. In addition, the legislation would suspend for three years the
availability of bonds for new shippers during the pendency of their antidumping reviews,
requiring instead cash deposits. The bill addresses cases in which new shippers have failed
to meet their antidumping duty payment obligations in instances where, for example, they
posted bonds and then went out of business before the duties were collected. On July 27,
2005, the House approved the Republican-sponsored bill with a vote of 255 to 168.243 As
noted above, the bill helped to ensure additional votes on the CAFTA-DR implementing
legislation in the House. On the Senate side, Senator Collins introduced a similar bill on
July 19, 2005. T4 But Congress took no further action on these bills.
In an effort to address increased imports from new countries after the imposition of an
antidumping duty order, Senator Blanche Lincoln (D-AR) introduced legislation to provide
for an expedited antidumping investigation.2 4 Specifically, the bill requires that the DOC
initiate an expedited antidumping investigation if it finds that imports from a new supplier
country have increased by 15 percent or more over the amount of imports from a com-
parable period preceding the initiation of the investigation of imports subject to the order.
By the end of 2005, the bill had been referred to the Senate Finance Committee.
On March 3, 2005, Representatives Jim Ramstad (R-MN) and Clay Shaw (R-FL) intro-
duced legislation (H.R. 1121) seeking to repeal the Byrd Amendment. Under the Byrd
Amendment, duties collected from antidumping and countervailing duty orders are given
to petitioners in trade remedy cases. In January 2003, the WTO ruled these payments
illegal. In 2004, a WTO arbitrator granted the co-complainants the right to suspend trade
240. See USTR Says Ukraine Bill Needs to Be Revised to address Administration Concerns, 22 INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA) 8, Feb. 24, 2005, at 294.
241. See Memorandum from Senator Chuck Grassley on Senate Passage of Jackson-Vanik Repeal for
Ukraine (Nov. 18, 2005), available at http://www.senate.gov/-finance/press/Gpress/2005/prgl 1 1805a.pdf.
242. See Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 E2d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
243. See FINA.L VoTE RESULTS FOR ROLL CALL 437, supra, note 234.
244. See United States Trade Rights Enforcement Act, S. 1421, 109th Cong. (2005).
245. See Expedited Remedy for Persistent Dumping Act of 2005, S. 1050, 109th Cong. (2005).
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concessions with the United States. Thus far, Canada, the EU, Japan, and Mexico have
imposed tariffs on certain U.S. imports.2- The Bush Administration has called for the repeal
of the Byrd Amendment in its 2006 budget proposal to Congress. The Byrd Amendment,
however, continued to have strong support in the Senate.2 47 H.R. 1121 was contained in a
House version of the 2006 budget reconciliation bill (H.R. 4241) but not in the Senate
version of the bill (S. 1932). On November 3, 2005, the U.S. Senate passed S. 1932, while
the House approved H.R. 4241 on November 18, 2005.248 However, since the Senate bill
did not contain the Byrd repeal, a House-Senate conference committee had to work on the
final provisions through the end of 2005 during which no final action was taken.
2 49
Lastly, on November 16, 2005, the Senate unanimously approved S. 695, which strength-
ens Department of Commerce regulations on collecting antidumping and countervailing
duties from 'new shippers' in current orders.5 0
E. MISCELLANEous TRADE LEGISLATION
On January 24, 2005, Senate Democrats introduced a bill, S. 14, the Fair Wage, Com-
petition and Investment Act of 2005. With respect to trade issues, the legislation requires
the USTR's office to conduct a meeting of the Trade Policy Group to develop a plan of
action if the U.S. trade deficit rises to more than 5 percent of U.S. gross domestic product
over a twelve-month period. Congress, however, took no further action on the proposed
measure. Similarly, legislation (S. Con. Res. 12) introduced on February 15, 2005, setting
forth minimum environmental, labor, and investment standards in future U.S. trade agree-
ment negotiations languished in the Senate.
Several lawmakers introduced bills creating a chief enforcement negotiator position
within the USTR.25' The prosecutor would be responsible for ensuring that U.S. trading
partners meet their obligations under the WTO and bilateral and regional trade agreements
with the United States. The bills require that the position assist the USTR in investigating
and prosecuting disputes before the WTO and pursuant to other trade agreements to which
the United States is party. But Congress failed to take action on any of these bills.
Lastly, Representative Bernard Sanders' (I-VT) bill (H.J. Res. 27) to withdraw the United
States from the WVTO failed to pass. On June 9, 2005, the House rejected the resolution
by a vote of 338 to 86.252 The Senate never introduced companion legislation.
246. See Japan OKs Countervailing Duties on 15 U.S. Products Because of Byrd Amendment, 22 INT'L TRADE
REP. (BNA) 31, Aug. 18, 2005, at 1344; Mexico Slaps Punitive Duties on U.S. Goods Due to Noncompliance with
WTO Byrd Ruling, 22 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 31, Aug. 25, 2005, at 1386.
247. See Efforts to Repeal Byrd Challenged Despite Legislation, EU Threats, INSIDE U.S. TRiADE, Mar. 18, 2005.
248. See Press Release, House Committee on Ways and Means, House Passes Budget Savings Package (Nov.
18, 2005), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/news.asp?FormMode = release&id = 355&keywords -
House + Passes + Budget + Savings.
249. See Repealing Byrd-In Two Years, WASHINGTON TRADE DMALY, Dec. 20, 2005.
250. See Press Release, Thad Cochran, Cochran Gains Approval for New Shipper Bill (Nov. 16, 2005),
available at http://cochran.senate.gov.
251. See Fair Wage, Competition, and Investment Act of 2005, S. 14, 109th Cong. (2005); S. 1542, 109th
Cong. (2005) (to amend the Trade Act of 1974 to create a Chief Trade Prosecutor to ensure compliance with
trade agreements, and for other purposes); United States Trade Rights Enforcement Act, H.R. 3283, 109th
Cong. (2005); H.R. 4186, 109th Cong. (2005) (to amend the Trade Act of 1974 to create a Chief Trade
Prosecutor to ensure compliance with trade agreements).
252. See USTR Says House WTO Resolution Vote Will Aid DR-CAFTA Support, INSIDE U.S. TRADnE, June 10,
2005.
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